


JPRS-TAC-90-001
8 JANUARY 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-90-001

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Radio Profiles Hubei Military Production Base

HK1612064689 Wuhan Hubei Provincial Service
in Mandarin 1000 GMT 12 Dec 89

[Excerpts] Thanks to efforts exerted over the past 20 years, the No 066 base in the mountain areas in the western part of Hubei, which belongs to the Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics Industry, has now become a large production base of military products. It is great in scale, is sufficiently staffed, and has the highest production output value.

In the last 10 years, the production output value of the new products that are successively manufactured has reached about 1 billion yuan, which is equal to 200 percent of the investment in components. Last year, the production output value of the 2 models of light carts reached 118 million yuan. This year the base has succeeded in attaining its magnificent goal of manufacturing large military goods on a trial basis [words indistinct].

In early 1980's, the task of the No 066 base for producing military goods was considerably reduced. Under such a serious situation, while developing larger and more technically advanced products, it made use of its existing workshops and facilities to produce on a trial basis light station wagons and Model 103 passenger-cargo vans with two-row seats. These products were sold on the market in a shorter period of time. [passage omitted]

The base has also made use of advanced technology for producing military products to extensively develop hi-tech products. It has successively succeeded in manufacturing brilliant drawing instruments, battery-operated welding machines, electronic lever scales, cigarette making machines, and so on. The technological level of the 1980's is needed for producing these products.

While making use of military technology to produce civilian goods, the base has persisted in giving top priority to producing military products, and has never relaxed its efforts in producing and developing military products. It has paid attention to integrating production of military products with that of civilian products, and giving play to the mutually promoting role. [passage omitted]

Due to effective integration of the production of both military and civilian products, the base has also attained better achievements in invention and technical transformation. In the last year, it won 1 great scientific award of the state, 2 scientific and technological progress awards of the state, 52 scientific and technological progress awards of the Ministry of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and 11 patent rights. In addition, 7 kinds of its products are awarded by the province and the ministry for excellent quality.

Malta Results Summarized

OW2012013189 Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English
No 51, 18-24 Dec 89 pp 9-10

[Article by Zhang Hua: "Superpower Relations Enter New Stage"]

[Text] As the two-day information summit meeting between U.S. President George Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev wound up on December 3, both leaders declared that a new stage in U.S.-Soviet relations was beginning.

"Now with reform under way in the Soviet Union, we stand at the threshold of a brand new era of U.S.-Soviet relations," a jubilant Bush said at an unprecedented joint press conference at the end of the summit held on board two vessels on the Mediterranean off Malta.

"We stated, both of us, that the world leaves one epoch of cold war, and enters another epoch," an equally elated Gorbachev declared at the press conference, adding, "We are just at the very beginning of our long road to a long-lasting, peaceful period."

According to the two leaders, they also agreed to:

- Resolve all acute issues involving the two superpowers by political means;
- avoid military interference in Eastern Europe;
- work together to conclude arms reduction agreements, particularly on strategic arms and conventional troops in Europe; and
- provide support to the Soviet reform.

The Malta summit took place at a time when the entire international situation, particularly that of Eastern Europe, was undergoing changes so rapid that the pace far exceeded conventional expectations. Both Washington and Moscow felt the need to better understand each other through an exchange of views.

The United States intended to obtain first-hand information about the reform movement that is sweeping the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe so as to adjust to the changes and attune its policy towards Moscow. While not wanting to lose anything because of ignorance of the situation, the United States was also afraid of damaging U.S.-Soviet relations and U.S. interests because of inappropriate handling of the relationship.

The Soviet Union, though stressing the importance of reaching disarmament agreements at summit meetings, welcomed any exchange of views with Americans and was willing to let them know more about perestroika (restructuring). Moreover, Moscow hoped to derive huge Western economic and technological co-operation from the informal summit. The Soviets had also been worried that the Americans would take advantage of the East European situation and affect the process of reform.

More recently, the opening of the Berlin Wall has presented new questions to the superpower leaders, mainly the reunification of Germany and security in Europe.

U.S. Initiatives

In a major divergence from its past attitude, the United States took the initiative this time by advancing a series of proposals aimed at improving relations with Moscow. These proposals mainly concerned two aspects—promoting the arms control negotiation process and enhancing U.S.-Soviet economic and trade relations. The United States suggested that agreements be reached in nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament, chemical weapons and nuclear testing next year and that support be given to Soviet efforts to join the Western market.

"The Soviet Union now seeks greater engagement with the international market economy, a step that certainly I'm prepared to encourage in every way I can," Bush promised.

Analysts believe that the U.S. change of attitude reflects Washington's intention to improve its diplomatic image. Moreover, it represents a belief that supporting the Soviet reform conforms to U.S. interests.

On the European situation, both sides adopted a cautious attitude and promised not to intervene in Eastern Europe's affairs. In particular, both avoided openly commenting on the question of the reunification of the two German states. Gorbachev, for example, said that both the West and the East must "remain realistic." He said his country did not want to do anything to accelerate the changes artificially for the peoples of the two German states.

"Each people has the right to decide, and does decide, the fate of its own state," he proclaimed.

Bush, for his part, said that although the United States is happy about the change in Eastern Europe, "I don't think it is the role of the United States to dictate the rapidity of change in any country."

"It's a matter for the people to determine themselves," he added.

Although the two leaders agreed on major issues, they differed on sea-launched cruise missiles and regional issues, especially over the Central American conflict.

Commenting on the Malta summit, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said on December 6 that China hopes the results of the meeting will genuinely help relax and stabilize the world situation, and will not harm the interests of any third party.

Disarmament Process Examined

HK1912042789 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
17 Dec 89 p 4

[Article by staff reporter Liu Kaichen (0491 7030 1368): "Promote Disarmament, Safeguard Peace—Commenting on the Adoption by the UN General Assembly Session of Two Chinese Sponsored Motions on Disarmament"]

[Text] United Nations, 15 Dec—The 44th UN General Assembly today once again unanimously adopted two important motions, on reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons respectively, both put forward by China. This is the fourth time in succession that the UN General Assembly has adopted such motions, the most sensitive political issues which have a bearing on world peace. These two resolutions, raised by China in an active and realistic spirit and in accordance with its consistent policy of opposing the arms race and safeguarding world peace, have enjoyed extensive support in the international community because they reflect the common understanding of all nations on the current situation and on the basic orientation and tasks of the disarmament movement.

In emphasizing the special responsibility of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—regarding disarmament and a cessation of the arms race, China has taken the status quo of the worldwide arms race into consideration. Over the past few years, the East-West military confrontation has been mitigated and international tension has been relaxed. Some progress has been made in the disarmament process, the main achievement in this field being the signing and implementation of the U.S.-Soviet agreement on the destruction of all intermediate- and short-range missiles. However, such limited measures are far from sufficient. The United States and the Soviet Union both still maintain the world's largest nuclear and conventional arsenals. While promising to carry on disarmament, both the powers have had the intention to "retain their own power and to cripple each other." For this reason, the progress of the disarmament talks has been slow. At talks held early this month, the U.S. and Soviet Government heads promised to do their best to conclude a treaty on reducing strategic nuclear weapons next year. One has to wait and see whether their promise will be fulfilled. The European conventional disarmament talks, involving 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact which began last March, are still in their initial stage and have not yet resulted in any agreement.

For the present, the nuclear weapons held by the United States and the Soviet Union still account for 95 percent of the world's stock of nuclear weapons. Both possess more than 10,000 offensive strategic nuclear warheads each. So, even if both take action to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads by 50 percent, they will still have some 6,000 warheads each. Furthermore, they are still constantly upgrading their advanced strategic nuclear force, which combines intercontinental ballistic missiles, long-range air- and submarine-launched missiles, and strategic bombers, and they are also competing with each other in developing outer space weapon systems which pose a serious threat to world peace and security. Conventional armaments are another major area of the U.S.-Soviet arms race. Particularly noteworthy is that

the United States and the Soviet Union, and the two major military blocs to which they belong, have amassed the world's largest conventional military forces, in Europe. According to statistics disclosed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the two blocs possess altogether 5.18 million troops, 81,694 tanks, 117,969 armored cars, 88,888 cannons, 12,446 combat planes, and 5,384 combat helicopters. Such densely deployed armaments are bound to cause formidable catastrophe to the people of Europe and the whole world, once a war breaks out and, quite likely, turns into a nuclear war.

The resolution put forward by China suggests that "it is necessary to solve the arms race problem in terms of quality as well as quantity." This reflects the international community's serious concern and worry about the dangerous tendency embodied in the arms race. Both the United States and the Soviet Union possess large quantities of nuclear and conventional weapons, much more than they actually need, and quite a portion of these weapons are outmoded and need to be updated. Now, while the two powers are going to reduce their weapons they are also applying the latest scientific and technological achievements to improve their weapons and develop new ones, including nuclear and conventional weapons. This poses an increasingly serious threat to mankind.

Thanks to the concerted efforts of all nations some progress has been made in the field of international disarmament. But we are still far from fulfilling the goal of nuclear and conventional disarmament which has a direct bearing on world peace and the security of all nations. All countries, big or small, strong or weak, have the right to participate in the discussion and settlement of the disarmament issue on an equal footing. Only with the concerted efforts of all nations will it be possible for us to make progress in the disarmament process.

Asian-Pacific Military Strategy Considered

HK1912050389 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS
EDITION in Chinese No 49, 4 Dec 89 p 25

[Article by Li Gang (2621 6921): "U.S. Debate on Asian-Pacific Security Strategy in the 1990s"]

[Text] Recently, a debate on the U.S. Asian-Pacific security strategy in the 1990s was carried out in the United States. The focus of this debate was whether the United States should stick to its present forward defense strategy or whether it should readjust this strategy in light of the changed circumstances.

This debate touched on the following questions:

First, how should the changes in Soviet Asian-Pacific policy and the U.S. role in maintaining Asian-Pacific security be viewed? People who advocated maintaining the status quo of the U.S. Asian-Pacific security strategy pointed out that although the Soviet Union had indeed reduced its Asian forces since Gorbachev came to power, the forces reduced were mainly land forces stationed along the Soviet-Chinese border. They emphasized that

the Soviets not only had not reduced their deployment of sea and air forces against the United States and Japan, but had stepped up the modernization of these forces and were trying to make up for troop reductions by upgrading the quality of their weaponry. They also held that since the future of reforms in the Soviet Union was anyone's guess, the Soviet Union could easily strengthen their Far East forces once the "conservatives" returned to power. Thus, they saw the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines as an important factor in the maintenance of security in the Asian-Pacific region, and argued that the reduction of U.S. forces in any of these areas would sound the signal of U.S. decline to the rest of the world. This would weaken U.S. deterrence in the Asian-Pacific region and would even affect the position of the United States in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East.

While admitting that any sudden and large-scale cutback of U.S. military presence in the Asian-Pacific region was both dangerous and undesirable, people who called for the readjustment of U.S. Asian-Pacific security strategy emphasized that a systematic readjustment was necessary. Former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Edwin Meyer and Asian affairs expert (Paul Kriesberg) held that since the Soviet threat to the Asian-Pacific region had diminished, China and Vietnam no longer posed a menace to their neighboring countries, and U.S. allies were becoming stronger and stronger economically, the United States should readjust its Asian-Pacific security strategy in such a way as to make U.S. presence conform to the security needs in this region. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger maintained that improvements in Sino-Soviet relations and changes in the Asian-Pacific balance would prompt the United States to reconsider its role in influencing Asia's future. He believed that in order to maintain the security of the Asian-Pacific region, the United States should play the part of a balancer between China, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Asian affairs experts Harry Harding and Edward Lincoln also held that the polarized structure of U.S. economic hegemony and international politics would first be ended in Asia. In the wake of democratization in the Asian-Pacific region, the United States will find the Asian-Pacific countries less and less willing to make concessions in matters of security cooperation. Moreover, following the rise of regional and Asian-Pacific powers, the influence of the United States and the Soviet Union in the region will decline. In the 1990s, the United States will no longer be able to rely simply on military means to maintain security in the region. It must rely on a combination of means, including U.S.-Soviet dialogue on the easing of conflicts in this region, encouraging its allies to share the burden, and protecting the system of open trade.

Second, U.S.-Japanese security cooperation being the cornerstone of U.S. Asian-Pacific security strategy, the debate naturally touched on U.S.-Japanese security relations in the 1990s. People who advocated maintaining

the status quo on this question held that since U.S.-Japanese security cooperation had served U.S. strategic interests so well in the last 4 decades, there was no need to make any changes. They believed that asking Japan to play a bigger role in defense matters will only upset regional equilibrium. Yale University Professor Paul Kennedy maintained that U.S. military presence in East Asia would weaken the economic competitiveness and strengthen the economic muscles of its rivals, namely, Japan and the "Four Little Dragons." He believed that the United States should reduce its forces in the region and let Japan shoulder a larger share of the defense burden. Asian affairs expert (Ronald Morse) also held that the time had come for Japan to play a bigger strategic role. The main reasons he gave were as follows: 1) Asian-Pacific security has a vital bearing on Japanese interests. Since Japan is an economic power in East Asia, it is only natural that it should play a bigger role in defense matters. 2) Since China has now become a problem for the United States in the region, the strengthening of U.S.-Japanese cooperation will be of help to the United States in dealing with the China problem. 3) Depending on Japan to contain the Soviet Union is more reliable than depending on China. Between these two extremes are those who advocated "the sharing of responsibility." They held that while the United States should continue to play a leading military role in maintaining Asian-Pacific security, Japan should make greater contributions in the following areas: It should increase economic assistance to countries of strategic significance to the West, shoulder a larger share of the expenses incurred in the stationing of U.S. troops in Japan, and increase the transfer of sophisticated technology to the United States.

Third, on the question of the Korean Peninsula, people who advocated maintaining the status quo held that the reduction of U.S. troops in South Korea would send the wrong signals to North Korea and hence jeopardize security on the Korean Peninsula. Those who advocated readjustment maintained that following the relative relaxation of East-West relations, the development of the economy and the modernization of military forces in South Korea, as well as the relative decline of U.S. economic strength, the United States must gradually

reduce its troops in South Korea and ask South Korea to pay more for the stationing of U.S. troops there.

Fourth, the U.S.-Philippines agreement on the use of military bases will expire in September 1991. Concerning the question of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, the United States has stepped up negotiations with the Philippines while the question is being debated in the country. People who advocated maintaining the status quo emphasized that because U.S. military bases in the Philippines have an important role to play in safeguarding the strategic position of the United States in the Asian-Pacific region, the Indian Ocean and the Middle East and because these military bases are conducive to the economic development and political stability of the Philippines, the United States should do its best to keep its bases on these islands. Other people, while acknowledging the importance of the Philippine bases to the U.S. Asian-Pacific security strategy, believed that as sentiments of nationalism soared among its people, the Philippine Government might demand a price too high for the United States. They maintained that as the threat posed by ASEAN against the Soviet Union diminished and as ASEAN gradually improved its relations with the Soviet Union and Vietnam, ASEAN would not tolerate the presence of U.S. military bases in the Philippines. They saw the gradual dispersal of the functions of the Philippine bases and the pulling out of U.S. bases in the Philippines by stages as inevitable. Some U.S. Asian experts proposed that in order to keep the Subic Naval Base at all costs, the United States should consider returning the Clark Air Force Base and turning it into ASEAN's air force training base.

In addition to the fact that different political forces and interest groups in the United States are all trying to influence the policies of the Bush Administration, a major cause of this debate is that the Asian-Pacific situation has undergone profound changes, including the readjustment of the Soviet Asian-Pacific policies, the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations, the relative decline of U.S. economic strength, and the rapid growth of the Asian-Pacific economy. Although the U.S. Government has not yet come to a final decision on these controversial issues, this debate will no doubt influence the choice of the future U.S. Asian-Pacific security strategy.

NORTH KOREA

Pyongyang Blasts U.S. Nuclear War 'Rockets'

SK2812074289 *Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean*
0007 GMT 26 Dec 89

[NODONG SINMUN 26 December commentary:
"Reckless Rockets of Nuclear Warmongers"]

[Text] The U.S. imperialists' criminal moves to deliver a nuclear preemptive strike on the northern half of our republic are heinously being conducted at a most dangerous stage.

In November and also in December, the U.S. imperialists conducted aerial nuclear war exercises almost everyday to attack the Northern half of the republic. Aircraft of various types, which participated in these exercises, numbered somewhere in the thousands. On 15 December alone, approximately 390 aircraft of various types flew above South Korea. Of course, both the U.S. imperialists' aircraft in South Korea and nuclear-capable F-15 and F-16 fighter-bombers, which are stationed in the U.S. imperialists' bases in Japan, Asia, and Pacific, participated in the war game. This shows that the U.S. imperialists, the nuclear warmongers, are further stepping up moves for a war against the Northern half of our republic.

It is not a secret that the U.S. imperialists have regarded the outbreak of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula as an established fact and that they have even mapped out a criminal nuclear war plan for northward invasion. To this end, the U.S. imperialists attach prior importance to a nuclear preemptive strike from the sky.

The U.S. imperialists seize air supremacy by quickly bringing aircraft of various types, including nuclear-capable fighter-bombers from their overseas aggression bases in the event of contingency and thus deliver a nuclear preemptive strike and attain their criminal goal. While on the topic of 3- to 5-day long northward invasion, the U.S. imperialists have mapped out such a short plan. This is because a nuclear preemptive strike from the sky is a precondition for this plan.

The repeated aerial nuclear war exercises by the U.S. imperialists may become a real war at any moment.

Recalling that the U.S. imperialists are alert to every possible chance to provoke a nuclear war and that the commander of the U.S. forces in South Korea is entitled to push the nuclear war button, the possibility of the situation turning into a real war any moment is great.

Together with aerial war exercises, the U.S. imperialists' aerial espionage acts have occurred more frequently. This is attributable to their nuclear war moves. The U.S. imperialists are scheming to board the train of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula, ride it to the vast expanse of the world, and thereby gratify their wild ambition for world domination.

It is not an accident that many aircraft, which are participating in aerial war exercises, exceed the boundary of our republic in their flying range.

The U.S. imperialists frequently talk about peace, detente, and disarmament. Their repeated aerial nuclear war exercises, however, prove that this talk is sheer lies. The U.S. imperialists are rushing headlong toward war and aggravating tension, not toward peace and detente and pursuing arms buildup, not disarmament.

Facts show that they are still following the road of war to conquer by force small countries, the countries which firmly adhere to the revolutionary banner in particular, while keeping themselves on good terms with big countries.

Because of the U.S. imperialists' nuclear war moves, the black cloud of a nuclear war hangs more heavily over the Korean peninsula with each passing day. As a result, the peace of the Korean peninsula and peace of the world is gravely threatened. Therefore, peace-loving people, expressing worry about the situation on the Korean peninsula, sternly denounce the U.S. imperialists' nuclear war moves.

The U.S. imperialists should stop the nuclear war rockets against our people and pull their forces and nuclear weapons out of South Korea without delay.

INTRABLOC AFFAIRS

Borsits Attends Pact Meeting in Moscow*LD1112190189 Budapest MTI in English 1807 GMT
11 Dec 89*

[Text] Budapest, December 11 (MTI)—The chiefs of staff of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states met in Moscow on December 11. They discussed preparations for the Vienna talks on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe to take place from January 11 to February 5, and for a simultaneous seminar on military doctrines. The Hungarian People's Army was represented by Lieutenant General Laszlo Borsits, chief of staff.

Soviet Commander on Troop Withdrawal From Hungary*LD2812212789 Budapest MTI in English 1759 GMT
28 Dec 89*

[Text] Budapest, December 28 (MTI)—Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group, who deals with the affairs of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary on commission from the Soviet Government, gave a statement on Thursday to the Hungarian news agency MTI, on the current situation of troop withdrawals and the schedule for 1990.

Mr Burlakov said that, in accordance with the latest decision of the Soviet Government, recently published in the Hungarian and Soviet press, further military units are to be withdrawn from the area of the Republic of Hungary in 1990. These are an air wing, a rifle regiment, two armoured car battalions and other units. The Soviet troops stationed in Hungary will be cut by more than 6,000 soldiers, more than 40 aircraft, 120 tanks, about 180 armoured vehicles, and more than 400 cars.

Colonel General Burlakov stressed that this decision of the Soviet Government results in troop reductions over the earlier unilateral withdrawal. When making the decision, the request of Debrecen residents was also taken into consideration: They asked that the Soviet air unit stationed near the city be re-located somewhere else as it was very near the residential area. This unit will also be withdrawn from Hungary next year. The additional reduction of Soviet troops is part of implementing the new Soviet military defence doctrine, the switch to the principle of rational, sufficient defence.

[Question] The partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from the areas of the Republic of Hungary began in 1989. What has happened so far and which units are to leave Hungary by the end of 1990, under the terms of both the earlier and the most recent decision?

"On the basis of the Soviet Government's decision, as part of the unilateral reduction of Soviet armed forces and armaments, a complete tank division, an armoured vehicle training regiment, a fighter plane regiment, and several other units are to be withdrawn from Hungary. In

totality, more than 10,000 soldiers, 470 tanks, more than 200 guns and trench mortars, more than 3,000 cars and other military vehicles have left Hungary for the Soviet Union. This decision already envisaged the withdrawal of further units from Hungary for 1990, the staff of which stands at around 2,000.

"On the basis of all these, the forces and staff of the Soviet troops stationed on the area of Hungary will be reduced in totality by more than 30 units, and about 18,000 soldiers will leave Hungary", Colonel General Burlakov went on to note.

"The announced troop withdrawal is progressing according to plans, as a result of which the Soviet units leaving Hungary have handed over many barracks, training bases and residential buildings to the Hungarian side. Soviet units have also been withdrawn from the Hungarian-Austrian border zone, and a 'zone of confidence' has thus come about. The vicinity of Budapest has also become more quiet, the air unit stationed at Tokol no longer disturbs the residents of Budapest's southern districts as the fighter plane regiment earlier stationed there has been withdrawn. The withdrawal of Soviet troops has, and continues to be realized in the spirit of openness and publicity."

[Question] What is expected with respect to the further reduction of Soviet troops? When will the troops be fully withdrawn from the area of Hungary?

"The speed with which the strength of the Soviet troops should be reduced, when and how these should be withdrawn, falls under the competence of the Warsaw Treaty member states. All this is in close connection with the pan-European arms reduction and disarmament process, and the state and progress of the Vienna arms reduction talks. The stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary can be explained exclusively with strategic reasons, as the southern wing of the NATO united armed forces has a considerable power superiority. Therefore, the further reduction of troops can be realized only in a well-considered manner. A condition of further troop reductions is that these take place in a balanced manner, on a parity basis", Colonel General Burlakov said in conclusion.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

GDR Ambassador, U.S. Congressman Received*AU1812131589 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech
13 Dec 89 p 8*

[Unattributed CTK report from the "International Contacts" column]

[Text] Jiri Dienstbier, CSSR foreign minister, received Helmut Ziebart, GDR ambassador and doyen of the diplomatic corps in the CSSR, in the Czernin Palace in Prague. H. Ziebart conveyed his congratulations to J. Dienstbier on being appointed to the post of CSSR foreign minister.

Thomas M. Foglietta, democratic member of the U.S. House of Representatives, met in Prague with Jiri Dienstbier, CSSR foreign minister. Shirley Temple-Black, U.S. ambassadress to the CSSR, was present at the meeting.

Army Tells Government To Dismantle Iron Curtain

*AU1512105789 Paris AFP in English
1044 GMT 15 Dec 89*

[Text] Prague, Dec 15 (AFP)—The Czechoslovakian Army has told the government to dismantle the "Iron Curtain" along the border with West Germany, new defense minister General Miroslav Vacek said Friday.

He told a press conference that the army command had proposed taking down the barriers "along the entire length of the borders" with both Austria and West Germany.

The dismantling of the barriers along the common border with Austria started Monday, following a decision taken November 30.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Fischer, FRG Official Discuss Disarmament

*LD1312205189 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1652 GMT 13 Dec 89*

[Excerpt] Berlin (ADN)—According to Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer, the GDR has great interest in extending the notion of the treaty community to questions of security policy, disarmament, and confidence-building. In a talk with the representative of the FRG government for disarmament questions, Ambassador Dr Josef Holik, in Berlin today, Fischer spoke in favor of the GDR and FRG exerting their influence both bilaterally and also in their respective alliances with the aim of diverse disarmament steps.

According to the Foreign Ministry, the partners in the talks agreed that the prospect of a common European house requires faster progress in reducing the high concentrations of armed forces and armaments in Europe. Disarmament must not lag behind the tempo of the political changes on the continent. [passage omitted]

Disarmament Consultations End 9th Round

*LD1312181189 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1554 GMT 13 Dec 89*

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The 2-day ninth round in the traditional consultations on disarmament questions between the GDR and the FRG ended in Berlin today. The GDR was represented by Deputy Foreign Minister Ernst Krabatsch, and the FRG by the disarmament representative of the Federal government, Dr Josef Holik.

In the talks there was agreement that everything must be done to prevent disarmament from lagging behind political developments in Europe, Krabatsch told journalists. "We discussed in a matter-of-fact way all areas of disarmament, and assessed where the main problems lie and what the two states can now undertake in order to advance disarmament." They worked on the assumption that the two states belong to different alliances, that there is, all the same, a broad spectrum of measures that can be advanced in disarmament negotiations. The GDR submitted a series of proposals to this end.

GDR's Hoffmann: NATO Must Also Disarm

*AU0212151789 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 30 Nov 89 p 5*

[ADN report: "GDR Defense Minister: NATO Should Also Disarm"]

[Text] Budapest—The defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact states attach great importance to constructive dialogue with NATO. The communique—which was published in Budapest on Wednesday [29 November] at the conclusion of the meeting of the Committee of Defense Ministers—stressed that, despite all positive changes in East-West relations, no fundamental changes have been achieved in the field of disarmament to date.

In a talk with Hungarian and GDR journalists, Defense Minister Admiral Theodor Hoffmann said in Budapest that the talks focused on the further implementation of the military doctrine aimed at preserving peace. It is high time for NATO to provide clear practical answers to the socialist states' unilateral disarmament steps, the minister asserted.

Referring to changes in the GDR, the minister pointed out that the National People's Army is studying the experiences of the other socialist countries' armies. As far as the military reform which has just been initiated in the GDR is concerned, special emphasis must be put on newly shaping the relations between the people and the Army, Defense Minister Hoffmann concluded.

Personnel Changes Made at Defense Ministry

*LD2912111289 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 0921 GMT 29 Dec 89*

[Text] East Berlin ADN—New people will be given leading functions at the GDR Ministry for National Defense and in the National People's Army [NVA] effective 1 January 1990, Ministry Spokesman Lieutenant Colonel Uwe Hempel announced today.

Lieutenant General Manfred Graetz, current head of rear services, will become deputy minister and head of the NVA Main Staff. He will replace Colonel General Fritz Streletz. Vice Admiral Hans Hofmann will become the new head of rear services.

Colonel General Horst Bruenner also will leave active service because the NVA Political Main Administration, of which he was head, will cease its work.

Lieutenant General Horst Skerra will become head of the Ground Forces Command from the beginning of the year. He will succeed Colonel General Horst Stachbarth in this function.

On 1 December, Lieutenant General Rolf Berger became head of the Air Force and Air Defense Command. In connection with the appointment of Admiral Theodor Hoffmann as minister for national defense, Vice Admiral Hendrik Born has begun work as head of the People's Navy.

Defense Minister Admiral Hoffmann thanked the departing servicemen for their long years fulfilling their duties and wished their successors much success in their work, in fulfilling the NVA's constitutional task, and in the renewal of the GDR's forces.

Defense Minister Approves Total Disarmament

LD2112185989 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1324 GMT 21 Dec 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—GDR Defense Minister Admiral Theodor Hoffmann has announced his approval in principle of total disarmament in the GDR. This emerges from a press interview by the minister with the *NORD-DEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN*, in which the initiators of the Appeal of The 89, a disarmament initiative set up by 89 public figures in the GDR, also participated.

In contrast to the representatives of the Appeal of The 89, who, given the ecological, economic and technical conditions in Europe, consider all military action, even for defense purposes, to be an act of self-destruction, the defense minister did not, however, endorse a unilateral prior concession by the GDR. Hoffmann stressed the concept of a gradual bilateral reduction of the armed forces of both systems on the basis of equal security, which can ultimately lead to the same goal.

HUNGARY

Karpati To Hold Talks on Soviet Troop Withdrawal

LD2112233489 Budapest MTI in English 1855 GMT 21 Dec 89

[Text] Budapest, December 21 (MTI)—Continuing the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, a decision has been reached on withdrawing a tactical missile brigade, a fighter bomber air wing, a mechanized rifle regiment, two armoured car battalions, and two construction troops [as received] from Hungary in 1990. In accordance with the troop withdrawal agreement announced at the beginning of the year, an assault battalion will also be withdrawn from Hungary. This was

announced by Minister of Defence Ferenc Karpati on Thursday in Budapest. At the joint session of parliament's foreign affairs and defence committees, held after the December session of the National Assembly ended.

Retired Brigadier General Janos Sebok reiterated his proposal, under which parliament should authorize the government to hold talks with the Soviet Government on fully withdrawing Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary by December 31, 1990. Justifying the motion, Mr Sebok said no military or political reasons exist for the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary. Therefore withdrawal cannot depend on the development of the Vienna arms reduction talks.

Mr Karpati reconfirmed that neither political nor military reasons exist for the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary. However, he stressed that troop withdrawals affect European stability, therefore these can be scheduled depending on the results of the Vienna talks.

As the session did not have a quorum, MPs [members of parliament] position of the committees on Mr Sebok's motion at another session, in early January. [sentence as received]

POLAND

Gdansk, Krakow Army Regiments Disbanded

LD1812224589 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 2200 GMT 18 Dec 89

[Text] In Gdansk, within the framework of restructuring the Polish Armed Forces, a territorial defense regiment has been disbanded. The soldiers have ceremoniously taken their leave of the unit's colors, which has been given to the Polish Armed Forces Museum. After 26 years of service, the Bartosz Glowacki territorial defense regiment in Krakow has also been disbanded.

Najder on USSR 'About-Face' Concerning Blocs

AU1512160789 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 12 Dec 89 p 7

[Commentary by Zdzislaw Najder, former head of Radio Free Europe's Polish section: "The USSR and Alliances"]

[Text] At a news conference on 25 November, during his first visit to Moscow, Premier Tadeusz Mazowiecki was asked to state Poland's attitude toward membership of the Warsaw Pact. Premier Mazowiecki replied that he foresaw the Warsaw Pact losing its military character and becoming a political alliance.

Ten days later, during a news conference off the coast of Malta, Gorbachev was asked about the future of the two great military blocs—the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact. His answer was that neither of these pacts "should remain military alliances, but should gradually change into military-political ones, and then purely

political ones." Gorbachev added that the character of these alliances will change in line with the changes on our continent.

I do not know to what extent this similarity of views is the result of mutual influence. Nevertheless, it is significant, and perhaps promising.

Until now, USSR leaders have usually highlighted not only the military nature of the alliance, to which the Polish People's Republic belongs, but also its ideological nature. Now there is no longer any talk about ideological ties at all. Nevertheless, I think another clear change is of no less importance, and is even more striking. As recently as 5 months ago, on 6 July in Strasbourg, Gorbachev repeated the traditional call to abolish both blocs, the Atlantic Alliance and Warsaw Pact, at the same time. We remember that this used to be one of the main components of Soviet political-propaganda strategy. Yet now, all of a sudden, there has been an about-face. It was confirmed by Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis on the basis of the talks he had held with Gorbachev in Rome, prior to the Maltese conference.

There is other evidence as well, so there can be no doubts. Therefore one has to consider why the USSR is abandoning its call to abolish the two political-military blocs. I think there are three reasons for this change.

First, the socialist camp is ceasing to be both socialist and a camp. Until recently, the communists held absolute power in every country belonging to this camp. Moscow could afford to call for the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact because its cohesion was guaranteed not by formal alliances, but by the links between the fraternal parties. Now that the parties are losing their importance with lightning speech and non-Communists are becoming premiers, the USSR will need to regulate intergovernmental relationships in order to secure cooperation with its allies. Therefore the Warsaw Pact is still needed.

Second, Moscow would like to control, and at least delay, the process of German unification as much as it can. Gorbachev has realized that the likelihood of neutralizing both German states at the cost of their unification is minimal. He also realizes that all members of the Atlantic Alliance would also like to postpone German unification. As a political bloc, they have a lot to say on this subject. Therefore, the two blocs have interests in common, which are mutually complementary.

Third, for urgent economic reasons, the Soviet Union is concerned about the earliest possible accord with the United States on arms reductions, as well as economic cooperation. This objective is more feasible and urgent than dreams about separating Western Europe from America. That is why in Moscow, the classic policy of compromise is replacing the calls to eliminate the dangerous military blocs. (Footnote) This commentary was broadcast by Radio Free Europe on 10 December.

YUGOSLAVIA

'Openness,' 'Cordiality' at Malta Meeting Viewed

AU2812165889 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian
5 Dec 89 p 2

[Zoran Mandzuka commentary: "Malta, Malta"]

[Text] Optimism is usually healthy, but when it comes in too big a dose, it can lead to conclusions imbued by excessive emotions. Does this also apply to messages that were reaching the coast from the turbulent waters of the Malta channel in which 2-day talks "without agenda" between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, as well as their aides took place?

The first impression is that the meeting concluded without any firm agreements—at least they were not publicized—of course we could count the agreement saying that the two leaders should officially meet in Washington next summer. After all, such agreements were hardly expected, because the meeting in the Maltese waters was convened much less because of bilateral currents, and much more because of events in international, primarily European currents. It goes without saying that the former is by no means excluded by the latter, above all because of the very role the United States and the USSR play in shaping overall relations in the world.

The strongest impression is that the meeting was held in an obvious atmosphere of stressed openness and cordiality (even relaxation) which was supposed to confirm the improving political climate in which Malta has shown that the division of the world, as established at Yalta or, better said, in the period following Yalta, has been disappearing. Moreover, it has been doing so rather quickly under often surprising conditions.

In the library of the "MS Maxim Gorkiy" where the talks were held, both George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev, when assessing results, have unreservedly used expressions of far-reaching significance. Although the "danger of exaggeration" was also pointed to, it was concluded that the world has broken with the cold war and found itself at an "essential turning point." In short, one may think that the "world peace has broken out."

Some mild dilemmas may still appear here. At least at this moment there is nothing to deny that there is a desire both in Washington and in Moscow to do as much as possible to make the old conflicts [suceljavanje] finally remain in the past, but it remains questionable if the very thaw in the relations between the great powers means abandoning the competition, or—something even more questionable—abandoning the road toward strictly bilateral talks.

Despite the already mentioned fact that no agreements have been signed, many topics were touched upon, arms for example. A proposal was heard, for example, that a summit of 16 NATO and 7 Warsaw Pact countries

should be held in Vienna next year. However, does that not sound like an attempt to return everything into bloc framework and does it not show—and it seems that it does—an American desire to remain in Europe not only in the political but also in the military way, something to which—due to certain interests—the Soviets probably are not showing more resolute opposition?

There is something else to be noticed, this time with fewer dilemmas. It is Bush's strongly expressed support of Gorbachev's perestroika. Leaving aside the question of how the American military-industrial complex will react to that, one should repeat that the American President expressed his conviction that the time has come to help the Soviet leader more. The impression is probably that the present process of releasing the tension has begun with perestroika itself and that the strengthening of the Soviet reforms can contribute to a further release and quicker democratization in Europe, and not only Eastern Europe at that. Behind this lies an impression that the Germans are most satisfied with the Malta talks—those in Bonn have already been confirming this.

The Soviet Union needs to improve its health. Mikhail Gorbachev asserted in Malta that "we have set foundations for the future," but despite the doubtless skill he shows in contacts with the outside world, he needs to invest as much effort in facing the situation in his own country. Bush's message—for the most part addressed to the opposition in the United States—is therefore necessary for both sides.

In the political earthquakes spreading over Eastern Europe—which was one of the priorities at the Malta talks—it becomes clear that the majority of people in the East see the West as the arena of freedom and, even more, as an example of a consumer society. Freedoms—as someone has put it—are now equalled not only to a way of life where everything is permitted, but also where everything becomes possible. It is our impression that in the Malta channel Mikhail Gorbachev himself agreed to this and that George Bush certainly did not oppose it.

What is the final result? It is certainly too early for more resolute conclusions, but it is clear that the United States and the USSR have been moving along the road of agreement more and more quickly. The strongly expressed optimism should not push aside the fact that it is Europe's duty to take care of Europe.

Yugoslav Weekly Interviews Genscher on Europe

*AU1412115889 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian
10 Dec 89 pp 53-55*

[“Exclusive” interview with Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Hari Stajner: “A Great Hope for Europe”—date and place not given]

[Text] [Stajner] East and central Europe are undergoing dramatic changes. What, in your opinion, are their main characteristics?

[Genscher] What is happening in East and central Europe is in fact a reminder of the general value of human rights, self-determination, humanity, human dignity, and democracy for Europe. These values are today expressed everywhere, because people are demanding them—through a nonviolent revolution. Freedom for an increasingly greater number of people; this is a great hope for Europe, a Europe which is bridging its divisions. Our main aim is to accomplish this. This development could certainly not have been possible without the historic policy of “new thinking” by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, especially his recognition that all states have the right to choose their own path of internal development.

[Stajner] To what extent does all this affect the status quo in Europe which, despite many crises, has ensured relative stability in Europe in the postwar period? Will anything be changed in this respect?

[Genscher] History is not static. The status quo is changing, because Europe is changing. The extremely relative stability during the cold war was founded on the division of Europe and was characterized by opposing views: political and ideological, military and economic. With what is happening today we are in fact leaving the Europe of opposing opinions behind. More freedom and democracy leads toward real stability.

Europe is becoming one, borders are increasingly losing their dividing character. The Germans are not excluded from this process of overcoming divisions in Europe. The fate of the Germans is embodied in that of other Europeans, and Europeans are in fact preparing themselves to build a lasting and just peace system in Europe, in a common European home. What is of crucial importance is that reforms in central and East Europe be carried out under the conditions of a stable framework. Their success is in the interests of all of Europe. As far as the FRG is concerned, this means that we will, doubtless to say, respect the agreements that we have reached with our neighbors in the East.

[Stajner] Could you please explain in more detail what you mean by “conditions of a stable framework?”

[Genscher] Under the conditions of a stable framework I mean the following: a resolute disarmament policy which will eliminate the fear of sudden attacks and offensives with the purpose of conquering territory, a policy that will simultaneously remove the burden of arms from the backs of European states. Establishing joint European security structures means, of course, stability for Europe. I am convinced that the Alliances will continue to play a role in preserving stability in Europe. Their political importance will increase. They are of key importance to the disarmament process which should not fall behind political developments.

The stable framework conditions also include broader economic cooperation in order to completely overcome the possibility of instability arising in the sphere of economics. We and our Western partners are ready to

demonstrate in a practical manner, through cooperation in all fields, our responsibility toward all Europe.

The stable development of Europe began with the CSCE process. This process represents the direction of our course. The CSCE process and its comprehensive security concept represents the framework for the global European architecture. It represents a solid foundation for creating a joint European community, for human rights, cooperation in security, dialogue, and broad cooperation. We must comprehensively develop a process which was started with the Helsinki Final Document in 1975 and which has now, in the phase of enthusiasm, received a new quality.

[Stajner] Changes in the GDR are followed with special interest, and even with great surprise. It appears that the opening of the Berlin Wall surprised everybody in the East, as well as in the West. How do you see the latest events in the other Germany, and how did you personally experienced the opening of the Berlin Wall?

[Genscher] The Soviet foreign minister, Edvard Shevardnadze, stated at the beginning of this year that the "iron curtain" has gone rusty. A few months later we were the witnesses of the "iron curtain" being dismantled. One of the great erroneous assessments which will go down in history was the claim, made only a few months ago, that the Wall will stand for another 50 or 100 years.

On the day the border between the GDR and the FRG was opened, I was in Berlin with Chancellor Kohl. For me, this was one of the most touching moments in my political career.

[Stajner] In this regard, a question that has been in the background for some time has become the focus of attention again—this is the reunification of Germany. What is the stand of the Bonn government on this question? To what extent do the provisions of the West German Constitution on the unification of all Germans influence the concrete policies of your government?

[Genscher] By swearing an oath of allegiance to the Constitution the members of the government have obligations to it. The Constitution mentions the unification of Germans, and we are striving for this. The Constitution also mentions our responsibility for peace in Europe. The rapprochement of the two German states is part of the European process of rapprochement in which the European Community is an important factor. Closer cooperation between the GDR and the FRG, for which the GDR government is striving, means at the same time rapprochement with the European Community. This is what the GDR Government clearly stated in its latest statement.

[Stajner] Let us assume, and this is indeed a hypothetical assumption, that the majority of the electorate in the free elections in the GDR decides to hold a referendum, and

that through this referendum the majority decides in favor of the reunification of the two Germanys. What would be your reaction?

[Genscher] Respecting the will of the people in the GDR demands that we act as their tutors. If the people in the GDR decide so, we will respect it, as we would any other decision.

[Stajner] If I am interpreting you correctly, you recently said that one should no longer talk about the Warsaw Pact, because it no longer exists, at least not in the form in which it existed and operated in the past. The Warsaw Pact, however, still exists, just like NATO. Do you think that there is a real possibility of eliminating them?

[Genscher] Changes in central and Eastern Europe, including the USSR, require a stable environment. These countries must know not only that we welcome their restructuring, but that in us they have a constructive partner for overcoming the division of Europe and for creating a peaceful system. As a partner in NATO, we are bound, together with the United States and Canada, to work toward this great aim on the basis of Armel's report.

If the member countries of the Warsaw Pact also work toward this aim, and if the cooperative security structures are gradually created, then the Eastern Alliance will also play an important stabilizing role at this time of transformations. The more comprehensive the cooperative security structures are, which is something that will reduce the military elements in East-West relations, the less the security-military thinking will determine the development of reforms in central and East Europe.

[Stajner] What does President Gorbachev's idea on the "common European home" mean to you in particular, that is, of course, if you agree with it?

[Genscher] With this idea of the "common European home" General Secretary Gorbachev positively responded to the concept of the "European peace system" as stipulated by Armel's report to NATO in 1967. The rapprochement of the East's and West's concepts, which is now gaining in prominence, provides a strong basis for dynamic changes in East-West relations.

In accordance with this, on 13 June 1989, both sides stressed in a German-Soviet statement of European significance that they will jointly work on creation of a Europe of peace and cooperation: on the "European peace system," or the "common European home" in which the United States and Canada have their firm seat. It is of paramount importance that the inhabitants in the European home actively and jointly maintain peace and order in this home and the peace system which is increasingly turning toward common European values, and toward the principles of operating according to the demands of the concrete political responsibility for the whole of Europe. The Helsinki Final Document must determine the house order.

[Stajner] What is the place of the nonaligned and neutral countries in this single and unified Europe?

[Genscher] Unity in diversity is an essential feature of Europe, the source of spiritual and material wealth. Europe is drawing strength from the multiplicity of various but somewhat related historic and cultural currents of one tradition. Europe is oriented toward openness, cooperation, and dialogue. In this, all countries are equal.

In this Europe there is place for various regional alliances and groupings which can become specific pillars of the future pan-European architecture. In this, non-aligned and neutral countries play a key role which, viewed from the European global perspective, they have been fulfilling in an exemplary way, especially because of their role as a road sign between the East and West in the CSCE process and the European Council, which is just now beginning to increasingly open itself to cooperation between the countries of central and East Europe.

[Stajner] This interview is being conducted before the meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev in Malta. Could you, regardless of the outcome of this meeting in Malta, tell me how you assess the position of the superpowers in the contemporary world which has considerably changed, especially recently?

[Genscher] I am waiting for the meeting between President Bush and General Secretary Gorbachev with great hope. This meeting will lead toward further rapprochement between the two superpowers and improvements in general conditions for East-West relations as a whole.

It is important that in the future architecture and security structures, Europe and the United States retain their place because the USSR is also in Europe. This is why we shall not be able to do away with the role of the United States in the future.

The West as a whole must ensure even greater stability of framework conditions so the reform processes can continue to develop. Gorbachev's historic merit lies in the fact that he, through his policy of restructuring and openness, opened the road to new thinking and development, which is in the West's interest.

[Stajner] There is another question that also partly requires an answer in advance. This interview will be published after the visit by Yugoslavia's President Drnovsek to the FRG, and after the meeting of the EC-Yugoslav Council for Cooperation. The question is: Can the EC, after numerous statements and agreements in principle that it is ready to provide help to Yugoslavia, do something more and more specific for Yugoslavia to overcome its economic difficulties?

[Genscher] Yugoslavia has been a privileged partner of the West since the beginning of the 1980's. The EC's trade concessions helped Yugoslavia turn its deficit of over 2 million ECU [European Currency Unit] in 1981 to a balance of payments surplus in 1988. The possibilities of a current financial protocol worth over 550 million ECU have still not been fully exploited.

If the economic and political reforms in Yugoslavia succeed, Yugoslavia will be in an even better position to exploit the advantages of the agreement on cooperation. At present, Yugoslavia needs to stimulate structural adjustments even more. The agreement with the IMF is the best proof of the worthiness of this. If this is achieved, the EC will be prepared to reexamine its auxiliary measures of support for the program of structural adjustments.

In addition, the EC is ready to start earlier negotiations on the next financial protocol (the current protocol will run out in mid-1991), to stimulate industrial cooperation through private investment, and to support Yugoslavia's preparations for the unified market.

[Stajner] Are you satisfied with the current state of relations and cooperation between the FRG and Yugoslavia?

[Genscher] Relations between our two countries have been very good in the past few years. This is manifested through regular political talks at a high level—the visit by Yugoslavia's President Drnovsek is one such example—and through a dense network of agreements on relations and comprehensive cooperation. Trade has been continuously growing in both directions. The good state of FRG-Yugoslav relations also permits constructive discussions on complex matters such as the influx of Yugoslavs seeking political asylum.

Otherwise, we are following with great interest Yugoslavia's efforts to implement political and economic reforms, as well as improvements in the sphere of human rights. We are encouraging Yugoslavia to continue along this road.

[Stajner] Allow me finally to ask you a "personal" question. You are probably the longest-serving foreign minister in the world. What was the most difficult thing in your long, successful diplomatic and political career, and what were you most pleased with?

[Genscher] During this long period in the position of foreign minister, there have been, of course, many ups and downs. However, my work has always been determined by aspirations toward gradually overcoming divisions in Europe. Today, we Europeans are closer to this aim than ever before and I am glad and happy that I can still actively contribute to this fascinating and dynamic process.

EGYPT

Israeli Reaction to Iraqi Missile Launch

NC2512123989 Cairo MENA in Arabic 2230 GMT
24 Dec 89

[Text] Cairo, 24 Dec (MENA)—AL-AHRAM warns Israel against taking any illegitimate action against Iraq as a result of its success in launching a missile that can carry satellites into space. The paper advises Israel to keep its concern over the launching of this missile within legitimate boundaries. It indicates that any new Israeli adventure could upset the tendencies toward peace in the area.

In Monday's commentary, the paper says that if the Iraqi missile aroused Israel's anxiety, the recent Israeli missile aroused the entire region. The paper stresses that it is important for both parties to keep their anxiety within legitimate boundaries, since it is a mutual anxiety and constitutes a kind of balance.

AL-AHRAM adds that there are Israeli forebodings that could arouse fears of this anxiety exceeding what is logical.

The paper points in this respect to Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhaq Rabin's response to Knesset questions in which he said: "Israel must make an appropriate decision regarding the Iraqi development."

The paper notes that this statement is open to interpretation. Ostensibly, it could denote the need to prepare for confronting any Iraqi progress in this regard by similar or superior progress; inherently, it could mean taking real measures to check this progress. Naturally, this last assumption is substantiated by the precedent of Israel's destroying the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

AL-AHRAM notes that Israel's erroneous interpretation of the launching of the Iraqi missile increases the need to be cautious about Israel's hidden intentions because it views Israel as "conditioned for military use" on the grounds that the missile appeared immediately after the Iraq-Iran war. This indicates that the missile's manufacture began and developed during the war so that it might be added to the array of missiles actually used in the war.

The paper concludes its commentary by saying that these interpretations could be Israel's excuse for a new adventure that would turn the trends of peace topsy-turvy in the region. Therefore, this necessitates caution.

INDIA

Hyderabad Company To Produce Short Range Missiles

BK2312155589 Delhi Domestic Service in English
1530 GMT 23 Dec 89

[Text] The Hyderabad-based Bharat Dynamics Limited, BDL, is to manufacture indigenously developed short range missiles, Prithvi [earth] and Trishul [trident].

Prithvi is a surface-to-surface missile system and Trishul a quick reaction surface-to-air missile system. They provide the Indian defense forces with the needed fighting punch.

According to the inhouse journal of defense and development laboratory, Astra, the first delivery is targeted for 1992.

Scientists Develop Agni Missile Technology

BK2512092489 Delhi Domestic Service in English
0830 GMT 25 Dec 89

[Text] The Indian defense scientists have developed a new technology that helps fabricate the country's recently tested intermediate-range ballistic missile, Agni. The new technology has been developed for the first time in the country with an indigenous design at the Defense Research Development Laboratory. The technology will meet the requirements of the country's aerospace industry for composite materials, providing stringent thermal, mechanical, and sectional features.

India Suggests Monitoring Arms in Space

52500015A New Delhi PATRIOT in English
15 Nov 89 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Stop Arms Race in Space: India"]

[Text] United Nations, Nov 14 (UNI)—India has urged against an arms race in outer space and has proposed establishing an international cooperative space mission called Peace-Protection of the Environment for Assuring a Cleaner Earth.

The idea, first put forward by an Indian space scientist at a conference in Italy, involves using a polar orbiting satellite equipped to observe and monitor key environmental parameters.

Addressing the United Nations special Political Committee last night, India delegate Rajinder Dutt said the project would involve space and other scientific agencies of various countries.

This, said Mr Dutt, would be a suitable response of the international space community to the problems and concerns of the global environment.

Indian delegate at UN also calls for an international cooperative space mission.

The suggestion for the project first came from professor U.R. Rao, chief of India's space research organisation earlier this year.

Mr Dutt said space agencies of participant nations could provide scientific payloads for land ocean monitoring and measuring ozone and pollution levels.

Such a project would also help spread space know-how to developing countries, he said.

Mr Dutt lauded recent American-Soviet moves to disseminate benefits of space technology to various countries and cited India's own efforts to share its experience in this area with other developing countries.

Indian delegate asked space scientists to help find answers to problems like hunger, homelessness and illiteracy.

"It is our firm belief," Mr Dutt said that "any arms race or military competition in outer space is incompatible with the objective of maintaining it for peaceful purposes."

India, he said, remained committed to peaceful uses of outer space.

PAKISTAN

Officer on 'Most Deadly' Antiaircraft Missiles

*BK1512160489 Islamabad Domestic Service in Urdu
1500 GMT 15 Dec 89*

[Text] Pakistan has started assembling the world's most deadly antiaircraft laser-guided RBS-70 missiles. At a briefing in Sargodha, the general officer commanding the Army Air Defense, Major General Agha Masud Hasan, said that these missiles could hit any flying object, including aircraft, helicopters, and pilotless aircraft,

within a 5-km radius with 100-percent accuracy. The RBS-70 is a missile that can neither be jammed nor be deceived by aircraft.

Agha Masud Hasan said that in connection with the air defense system, more attention is being paid to the development of equipment using indigenous technology. Under this policy, a master plan has been prepared and successfully executed, which has led to the creation of a strong ground air defense system that is very inexpensive and will prove highly effective in dealing with any threat. Other achievements of the Army Air Defense include the production of pilotless, remote-controlled aircraft, armored personnel carriers and radars, and also improving guns on modern lines and installing computer systems in guns currently in use so that they can remain effective until the end of the century. The general officer commanding the Army Air Defense particularly thanked Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan, who has given a gift of the shoulder-fired Anza missile, which has been produced in Pakistan and whose striking range is 4.2 km. The missile weighs 9.5 kg.

Pakistan has already installed the laser-guided RBS-70 and Anza missiles on armored personnel carriers so that they can be easily used in the event of war. These two missiles are being tested in the ongoing military exercise codenamed "Zarb-i-Momin," Agha Masud Hasan announced.

Japanese 1990 Military Budget Questioned

90WC0022B Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
30 Dec 89 Second Edition p 1

[Article by Igor Latyshev: "The Draft that Evoked a Condemnation"]

[Text] Tokyo, 29 December—Today Japan's Cabinet of Ministers finally approved the government's draft national budget for fiscal year 1990. The items in this draft determining the military appropriations attracted the public's greatest attention—appropriations which, as we know, have been increasing from year to year lately and now give way in dollar amounts only to the military spending of the United States and the Soviet Union.

A look at the new government draft budget shows that the government of Japan once again has not abandoned its course of further building up the country's military might. The draft national budget approved by the Cabinet of Ministers calls for a 6.1 percent increase in appropriations for military purposes in fiscal year 1990. In absolute figures, these appropriations will reach the astronomical sum of 4,159,341,000,000 yen. Japan has never in its entire postwar history had such large expenditures for military purposes.

From newspaper reports it also follows that the military appropriations planned for 1990 should ensure completion of the weapons program passed earlier, after which another, so-called "intermediate" program will be implemented. A considerable portion of the appropriations approved by the government will also be aimed at maintaining hired personnel servicing U.S. military bases located in Japan.

Initial information about the course adopted by Japan's Cabinet of Ministers at further increasing the country's military spending resulted in sharp criticism on the part of peace-loving circles in opposition to the government, including the leaders of the socialist and communist parties, trade unions, and local public organizations, and also the press. A number of newspaper articles of recent days emphasize the groundlessness of conjectures about the existence of some "Soviet military threat" being used by the government as a pretext for further building up the country's arms. Peace-loving circles of Japan are expressing their outrage that the course adopted by the government is not in keeping with the spirit of Malta and the Soviet-American understandings aimed at ending the "cold war" and reducing arms.

In its lead article today, entitled "A Budget Not in Keeping with the New Times," the MAINICHI SHIMBUN—one of Japan's largest newspapers—writes: "At a time when in the entire world, beginning with the United States and the Soviet Union, the striving for disarmament is growing, Japan alone is acting strangely, going farther and farther along the path of a continuous increase in its military spending."

The draft national budget adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers today will be submitted for discussion and

approval of the regular parliament session in late January. There is no doubt that the military items in this budget will evoke serious objections of the representatives of broad sections of the Japanese public in parliament as well as beyond its walls.

Military-Industrial Complex Opposition to Disarmament Noted

90WC0022A Moscow SOVetskaya Kultura in Russian
26 Dec 89 p 1

[Article by Grigoriy Oganov: "The Threat...of Peace"]

[Text] "The Threat of Peace!" This is how the serious press of America, or rather of the United States, phrases the main problem of our time worrying the well-established business people of Wall Street. Of course, not everyone agrees with this kind of "wording" of the thoughts gripping business people who have been through a lot recently, American businessmen in the vernacular, and to tell the truth, far from all of what has been taking place corresponds to this "feeling."

There is more alarm than meaning in the words.

In the maze of doubts there is emerging the thought that this kind of thinking can appear only in those who do not properly accept the postulates of the new political thinking and its very spirit; those who fear conversion, disarmament, and concluding corresponding treaties; and, in the final analysis, those who fear an improvement in the international situation. The question basically comes down to how hardy the so-called military-industrial complex is. How much can it preserve the possibility and ability to growl, baring its nuclear teeth, and snarl at the small forces that have become wide awake and have conceived a world without wars and without (for the time being!) nuclear weapons.

By the name "military-industrial complex," I do not mean just this complex itself, as such, with its perfect high-tech gigantic plants, with its first-rate design offices and laboratories that have robbed from humankind the better half of its intellectual potential which could have tens if not hundreds of millions of people happy if the brain power of this potential would have been directed at creation instead of at creating the devil's weapons of destruction.

How important this would be for us, getting ready to fix our economy after long years of vegetation and neglect!

But it is not just the prospects for development of the economy. It is a matter of eliminating the self-contained, excessive military and militaristic forces, hanging like a sword of Damocles over humankind. It is precisely at this first spurt that the efforts of Soviet foreign and domestic policy are aimed—this is the meaning of all the peaceful initiatives of the USSR.

Let the Bomb rot; let peace reign on Earth!

**NEW TIMES Interviews John Mroz on
Disarmament Issues**

18120023A Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 41,
10-16 Oct 89 pp 5-6

[Interview with John Mroz by Evgeny Andrianov:
"Thinking the Unthinkable"]

[Text] [NEW TIMES] Mr Mroz, the opening of the 44th session of the U.N. General Assembly was preceded by the meetings of the Soviet foreign Minister with President Bush and Secretary of State Baker. At the session both George Bush and Mr Shevardnadze assessed these meetings as positive. How justified is their optimism?

[John Mroz] In my opinion, the U.S. has concluded the period of reassessing its attitude to the dialogue with the USSR. Everyone was aware that the time of confrontation was over, but the question was whether we were prepared to enter the era of cooperation. I believe that during the Washington and Wyoming meetings, or shortly before them, the administration decided it was ready for a higher level of relations with your country than before. And I think this was reflected in both speeches.

[NEW TIMES] What prospects do you think have been opened up?

[John Mroz] That depends on the specific problems. Take, for example, a traditional issue like human rights. At present we don't have many differences. Thanks to glasnost and perestroika, changes are under way in Soviet legislation and attention is increasingly being paid to the rights of the individual. Although our societies have different priorities in this field, human rights are no longer an obstacle to the development of relations and cooperation.

Or take the disarmament issue. Serious progress is shaping up here as well and not just in the sphere of chemical weapons of which the president spoke at the session. I don't think it's rash to predict that we'll sign the START treaty within a year from now. However, I must stress that the treaty will have psychological rather than military significance. I am concerned about another problem: our progress along the path of disarmament is still very slow. While we discuss cuts in the existing strategic systems, experts in both countries are developing more sophisticated weapons, which remain outside the limits of the treaty. I think we must hurry up.

Moreover, our positions on regional conflicts have also drawn closer.

[NEW TIMES] In his speech at the United Nations Foreign Minister Shevardnadze suggested that both superpowers eliminate their stockpiles of chemical weapons on a bilateral basis, without waiting for other countries to do so. What do you think the U.S. administration's reaction was?

[John Mroz] I think that the Soviet Foreign Minister has proposed quite a realistic disarmament scheme, and the administration duly appreciated this.

However, I believe that as far as chemical weapons are concerned, the administration will insist on its own option: an 80 per cent reduction in U.S. chemical arsenals and the attainment of a qualitatively and quantitatively equal level with the Soviet Union. (If you have more chemical weapons, you reduce more and vice versa.)

As for the complete reduction of chemical armaments, I believe the administration views it as the second stage of the process, on which it will embark, provided all countries that possess chemical weapons take part in the reduction.

I am aware that like a 50 per cent reduction in strategic armaments, an 80 per cent reduction in chemical weapons will not remove the threat to mankind. Both reductions have more psychological significance than otherwise—they will demonstrate that real cuts in offensive weapons of mass destruction are feasible. But when we decide to take the first steps in this direction, we must be aware of the ultimate aim. Hopefully, with chemical weapons this process will be speedy. At least our countries have stated unequivocally that they are determined to eliminate chemical weapons from the globe.

As for nuclear weapons, so far I don't see any realistic prospects of universal and complete nuclear disarmament. In the connection I paid special attention to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze's remarks about minimum nuclear deterrence. Later he echoed President Gorbachev's call in Strasbourg for a meeting of the nuclear powers and countries that have nuclear weapons deployed in their territories, at which measures could be elaborated to minimize the difference between the nuclear-free world and the world that lives in conditions of minimum nuclear deterrence. The very fact that your country is seriously prepared to discuss our point of view and voice its own considerations about further progress is, in my opinion, very positive.

[NEW TIMES] What is the reaction of Western politicians likely to be?

[John Mroz] I can't make forecasts. The fact is that in the United States and other Western countries there are influential politicians who believe that in inviting us to discuss the problem, the Soviet Union wants to revive the issue of reducing British and French INFs. The Western stance on this issue is well known. I'm afraid neither the U.S. nor its allies will rush to accept the Soviet proposal. However, it wasn't rejected out of hand, whereas formerly neither Moscow nor Washington would have hesitated for a moment to do so. This is very characteristic of the present period. We've become more thoughtful in analyzing each other's proposals, and there is less prejudice in our relations.

Returning to your question, I would like to say that your leadership's proposal will initially be considered at the level of experts. I would also like to add that the efforts of my institute to get a special conference convened on minimum nuclear deterrence, to be attended by experts from the countries Mr Gorbachev and Mr Shevardnadze spoke of, were not resisted by the administration. Naturally, at meetings like this, soviet, American, West German, British and other experts represent only themselves and their research centres. But I would say that that's where the principles of the approaches to specific problems are worked out. Then the dialogue continues at the level of politicians.

[NEW TIMES] In this connection let's discuss the issue of security in general... [John Mroz] The concept of security has been considerably expanded of late, as was reflected in the speeches by President Bush and Minister Shevardnadze. We are speaking less about NATO-WTO military confrontation and paying more attention to other destabilizing factors: internal developments in our countries, ecology, demography, the economy and drugs.

However, the expansion of the concept of security blurs our vision and prevents us from seeing our aim and the ways to achieve it...

[NEW TIMES] For instance...

[John Mroz] At the beginning of this year President Bush said the doctrine of nuclear deterrence had become obsolete after the Soviet Union changed its approach to foreign policy and declared the "off-deterrence" doctrine. What does this mean politically? I don't know. The same applies to the doctrine of minimum nuclear deterrence and a nuclear-free world, and to many other concepts that have become familiar political slogans but nothing more.

Our time is characterized by a failure to analyze political slogans in depth, and this impedes their implementation. But this malady is characteristic of periods of radical political changes. That's why to some extent we can regard all this as a positive and hopeful sign. Sometimes it's easier to define a phenomenon in international life than to find direction in which it should develop.

[NEW TIMES] The expansion of the concept of security also alters the concepts of "enemy" and "adversary"...

[John Mroz] ...Naturally, who is the U.S.'s chief adversary? For years we used to think it was the Soviet Union. Likewise the U.S. used to be your main adversary. Now that it has become obvious that the U.S. and the USSR aren't going to attack each other with their nuclear, chemical and other arsenals, it appears that America's main enemies are the three families in Colombia who control drug trafficking and are really threatening the lives, health and values of both this and future generations. You in your country also have formidable problems that seemed unthinkable only recently.

This is not to say that our countries do not represent a military threat to each other. But we have entered a period in which we see other transnational factors too (not just NATO and WTO tanks)—AIDS, drugs, the ecological situation—these are becoming our enemies. Common enemies. Which of them is the most dangerous? Perhaps one we haven't yet identified? I think that, while solving current problems, we must reflect and think the unthinkable. The more so as many things that seemed inconceivable only five, three, two or even one year ago have already been realized or are points on the negotiations agenda.

[NEW TIMES] Why do you think President Bush dwelt in length in his speech on chemical weapons, while almost ignoring nuclear ones? Does this imply that the issue of nuclear disarmament has been settled, or that it is not a priority for his administration?

[John Mroz] I can't speak for the president, but my opinion is as follows. On the one hand, President Bush has already been involved in the issue of chemical weapons for a long time, and he is not one to leave any business unfinished.

Besides, it's absolutely clear that after the recent mutual shifts at the Washington and Wyoming meetings, the START treaty can become a reality as early as 1990. Though I think it won't be signed during the coming superpower summit, but will be ready for signing at the next summit meeting.

[NEW TIMES] This means that 1990 will see two soviet-American summits?

[John Mroz] I don't think this possibility can be ruled out.

[NEW TIMES] You named only one reason why President Bush only outlined the problem of nuclear armaments...

[John Mroz] Another reason is the complexity of the problem of nuclear armaments after the START treaty. There is no united stand on this issue inside NATO, because a number of aspects of the problem are beyond the parameters of Soviet-American relations.

[NEW TIMES] And the last question, which we have already touched on, but which I would like to emphasize. How do you view the coming summit?

[John Mroz] It could be a momentous and epoch-making event. George Bush said that deterrence was over. If so, then we are on the threshold of cooperation, although only on the threshold.

In recent years we have lived through the Reagan-1 (confrontation) and Reagan-2 (normalization) periods. The latter is still going on (this is a good example of continuity in politics). The coming summit will hopefully be a step towards the next stage—the stage of cooperation.

The new period will embrace not only the issues of disarmament and arms control, but also that of the economy, where considerable progress could be achieved in the coming year. At present, the administration is active in encouraging American business to develop commercial ties with Poland and Hungary. The agenda is very extensive and includes joint ventures, investments and technology. I don't see any reason why cooperation in this direction couldn't develop with the USSR too, all the more so as economic cooperation between our two countries would be mutually profitable.

During the years of confrontation we proved that we could stir up trouble for each other more or less successfully. Now we are approaching the understanding that we can be partners and that our partnership can embrace many spheres.

[NEW TIMES] You said you were thinking what was once unthinkable...

[John Mroz] In the near future we will indeed be doing what we thought was impossible. In fact, it seems to me that we are already doing it...

Washington, Paris, and European Security

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[Article by Viktor Sergeyevich Mikheyev, candidate of juridical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Washington, Paris, and European Security"]

[Text] France's unique status in the North Atlantic alliance, a nuclear strategy differing radically from the American one, and Paris' hope of strengthening its own position on the European continent by reducing the influence of both "superpowers" are the reasons for the complexity of its partnership with the United States. The conflicts which once had sensational overtones, however, occasionally obscured another side of the American-French partnership—the close social and politico-military cooperation by the two countries within the Atlantic framework. This has always served as the basis for the improvement of bilateral relations, even during the periods of extreme tension under de Gaulle and G. Pompidou. As long as the factors which gave birth to the Atlantic system exist, it will continue to exist and to have a serious effect on the entire situation in Europe. Of course, this does not mean that the role of these factors has remained unchanged. The relative decline of their significance is the reason for the stronger centrifugal tendencies in the Atlantic system.

The United States and France represent the two extremes in the Western camp—Atlanticism and Europeanism. The United States' attempts to dominate the Atlantic camp and France's desire for independence, combined with each side's hope for stronger allegiance from its allies, come into conflict. To expand French

(and West European) independence, Paris will have to change the very system of Atlanticism and the system of European security, and it has been striving to make these changes for three decades now. These issues are the subject matter of this article.

Gaullism and Atlanticism

European security is one of the deep-seated problems in American-French relations. It has two facets. The first is the degree of the West European "power center's" autonomy in relation to the United States. The second is the European area of East-West relations, the balance of power in Europe.

Oddly enough, it was France that was one of the main initiators of the North Atlantic Treaty, the cornerstone of the Atlantic system, after World War II. It had its own reasons, of course, for doing this. The shock of the defeat of 1940, the radical change in the traditional, centuries-old balance of power in Europe, the establishment of a socialist regime in the Eastern European countries, and the increasing activity of leftist forces in Western Europe, especially in France itself (Communists were part of the government until 1947), were the main factors promoting the right wing's "Atlantic" initiative. Furthermore, people in Paris, and in the West in general, were less afraid of a direct military invasion from the east (especially since few believed this could happen after the Americans had the monopoly on the atomic bomb) than of the rapid spread of socialism's political influence. The fierce image of the Stalinist regime, the frighteningly repressive nature of which was associated in the West European mind with unpredictable foreign policy actions, also played a part in the decision of France and of Western Europe as a whole to form a politico-military alliance with the United States.

When this historic postwar transatlantic bargain was struck with the United States in the security sphere, however, Western Europe, and especially France, apparently did not realize the full implications of the deal. After granting the Old World its politico-military guarantees, primarily nuclear, the United States initiated the creation of a centralized military organization not envisaged in the treaty—the NATO Integrated Military Command—under its own control (the war in Korea was the catalyst) soon after the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, which turned 40 this year. The mechanism of the IMC gave the United States the leverage for politico-military dominion in the Atlantic system.

Whereas France's neighbors submissively accepted the unprecedented change in Europe's traditional politico-military principles, Paris began resisting this move even before de Gaulle returned to power. France had been playing a major part in European politics for centuries. Its victories alternated with defeats, but the main thing did not change: France was the leading power in Europe. This left its imprint on the national consciousness and influenced the behavior of the leaders of the Fourth Republic, not to mention de Gaulle, who resolutely

revived the idea of the preeminence of France to counterbalance the United States' domination of the postwar Atlantic system. To a considerable extent, this historical influence is still present today.

After de Gaulle had carried out a major constitutional reform and instituted a strong presidency, he proposed the **new theory of European security** which led to fierce conflicts with the United States. The basic premises of this theory are important in an understanding of France's current foreign policy, which clearly sets it apart from the rest of Western Europe (although the Gaullist doctrine of European security was deformed by the "Atlantic" pressure exerted on it by the United States, England, the FRG, and other countries, and even by rightwing forces in France itself, it nevertheless has a definite effect on French policy today). **In essence, de Gaulle believed that Western Europe should rely on its own strength to guarantee its own security.** To attain this goal, de Gaulle felt it would be necessary, on the one hand, to form a politico-military confederation of West European countries and create a "Europe of homelands" and, on the other, to relieve tension in Europe and lessen the confrontation between the blocs—which was, according to de Gaulle's firm conviction, the "superpowers'" main instrument of domination. As a result, the postwar security system was to be replaced, according to de Gaulle's plan, with a new system distinguished by a balance of power at a low level between the USSR and a confederated Western Europe, the neutralization of the Eastern European states as a result of the development of political pluralism there, the restoration of the close historic ties between Western and Eastern European countries, and the complete eradication of the postwar division of the continent. It is significant that the new system of European security was expected by the Gaullists to affirm France's leadership, extend its influence to the entire European continent, and restore its traditional historic role to some extent.

Because de Gaulle's actions matched his words, the attempts to carry out this plan led to serious conflicts with the United States: **The American idea of European security was obviously incompatible with the French idea. The United States proceeded from the assumption that Atlanticism had to take priority over Europeanism and that NATO had to be preserved unchanged as a counterbalance to the USSR and the main instrument of U.S. influence in the Western alliance.** The United States was disturbed by the autonomous efforts of France and then of the FRG to relieve tension. After Western Europe had been liberated from German occupation by American troops, after its economic recovery had been made possible by the Marshall Plan (and the capitalist order had been stabilized as a result of this), and after the Old World had been offered nuclear guarantees, the United States believed it was completely justified in retaining and even strengthening its role as the Atlantic leader.

In de Gaulle's time, France not only withdrew from the NATO military organization but also opposed J. Kennedy's "Grand Design" of transatlantic integration

and played the decisive role in preventing its implementation. France put up the strongest resistance in Western Europe to the creation of the multilateral NATO nuclear forces—an instrument of U.S. control over the allies in the nuclear sphere (this American idea also turned out to be impracticable). In contrast to England, France rejected the U.S. offer of American Polaris missiles in exchange for its consent to integrate French nuclear forces into the NATO structure.

France's closest allies in Europe, England and the FRG, did not support the Gaullist theory of European security, however, and primarily because de Gaulle's plan envisaged the eventual separation of Western Europe from the United States. For several reasons, especially their strong politico-military dependence on the United States, they adhered to the traditional NATO idea of security. No one followed France's example by withdrawing from the NATO military organization in those years. The centrifugal tendencies in the bloc (which de Gaulle foresaw) began to grow stronger later.

Difficulties of Mutual Adaptation

Although American-French relations improved at first under G. Pompidou, this was only a temporary thaw. When Washington was unable to gain control of French nuclear forces in the 1960's with an agreement similar to the Anglo-American agreement in Nassau (on deliveries of U.S. launchers for English submarines), it suggested a new type of cooperation to Paris in the beginning of the 1970's—to be based on coordination rather than subordination. The purpose was to attach France, which was autonomously building up its own nuclear forces, more closely to NATO without offending French pride. According to a recent article in the summer issue of *FOREIGN POLICY* by Princeton University Professor R. Ullman, in 1972 the United States began supplying France with information about the technology for the development of new types of nuclear weapons in accordance with a secret agreement. In exchange, Paris agreed to coordinate the aiming of its missiles at Soviet targets with Washington and to work with the NATO integrated military command. Later, in 1978, the two countries concluded a secret agreement on the delivery of American supercomputers (previously banned for export) to France in exchange for Paris' promise of even broader politico-military cooperation with the United States and NATO. As the new major U.S. initiative known as the "Year of Europe" got underway in spring 1973, however, France, as the leader of Europeanism, began resisting Atlanticism in every way possible. Besides this, the American-French dispute acquired a new dimension: France began acting on behalf of the EEC, as the leader of the process of West European political integration the EEC had launched at the turn of the decade. France stubbornly opposed the United States' main plan of expanding the Atlantic system and combining politico-military issues in a single package with economic and energy problems, which certainly would have increased U.S. influence in the allied countries. The sharp disagreements with France over the "Year of Europe" were

compounded by conflicts over such major issues as the Middle East crisis and Western energy policy. In the second volume of his memoirs, H. Kissinger wrote that "if France insisted on freedom of action in the Middle East, refused to participate in a consumer grouping on energy, and saw no point in any 'Atlantic declaration,' little was left of the Atlantic dialogue."¹ In spring 1974, the disagreements reached the point of unprecedented events: The President of the United States publicly threatened the allies with a revision of the American politico-military guarantees to Western Europe—i.e., the bases of the entire Atlantic system and of "bloc" security in Europe. Addressing his remarks primarily to France, he declared that the allies could not "have U.S. participation and cooperation on the security front and then proceed to have confrontation and even hostility on the economic and political front."²

When a definite choice had to be made, no one in Western Europe saw France as an alternative to politico-military reliance on the United States, and France itself could not aspire to this role. Even today, 15 years later, Paris is not assuming these obligations. When President F. Mitterand addressed members of the government and the armed forces command on 11 October 1988 on defense policy planning, he stressed that the French nuclear forces could not guarantee the security of the FRG (not to mention all of Western Europe—V.M.).

This has not kept France from assuming the role of Europeanism's leader; it has much broader scope for foreign policy maneuvers in the Atlantic system and the system of East-West relations than, for instance, England. In the 1970's, however, French policy on matters of European security became more pragmatic and they can still be described in this way today. France is trying to avoid the exacerbation of political relations between the United States and Western Europe to the point at which Washington would publicly threaten a revision of its politico-military guarantees to the allies, as it did when G. Pompidou was president. Paris agrees with the idea of West European politico-military integration with the aim of strengthening the "European pillar" of the North Atlantic alliance. This is the basic postulate of the Western European Union's "Security Platform," a policy planning document signed by France. When President F. Mitterand was interviewed on the TF-1 television network in the middle of July 1988, he stressed that the idea of separating the United States from Europe is an illusion. In September 1988, H. Vedrine, official spokesman for the Palais Elysee, said that France felt it was "exceptionally important" to conduct an analysis of the current international situation in conjunction with the United States and to elaborate a common stance on disarmament, regional conflicts, and several other issues.

France has had to adjust its foreign policy in line with the Atlanticism of the FRG, England, Italy, and other countries. It remembers that the allies did not support France's objections in the middle of the 1970's when the

decision was being made on the establishment of a new institution of the Atlantic system—the International Energy Agency.

The growing strength of the Atlantic tendency in French foreign policy in the second half of the 1970's was the result of domestic politics (the Gaullists lost the presidency in spring 1974) and international politics: The foreign policy of the USSR began displaying more reliance on force in the late 1970's and early 1980's. The deployment of the SS-20 missiles, the entry of Afghanistan by Soviet troops, and the USSR's willingness, as the West assumed, to react to the events in Poland with a show of force helped to bring France closer together with the United States and NATO. After all, it was no coincidence that de Gaulle regarded stable detente in Europe as an essential condition for the success of his European security plan.

The changes in French policy, however, were only one side of the matter. The main cause of the improvement of American-French relations in the second half of the 1970's was the United States' renunciation of major Atlantic initiatives like the "Year of Europe" (the Carter administration felt that they were counterproductive and insulting to the allies). The American idea of the "great Atlantic civilization" turned out to be groundless in the face of mounting West European independence. Although Reagan resolved to strengthen American leadership in the Western alliance at the beginning of the 1980's, he did not undertake any broad-scale assaults on Europeanism. The slight increase in Atlantic tendencies in the foreign policy of the West European countries was less a result of the United States' plans than of increasing international tension. The following fact is indicative: When the United States tried to exacerbate the situation artificially by insisting that the allies refuse to take part in the massive Siberia-Western Europe pipeline project with the USSR, all of its attempts were futile. The Old World resisted this excessively "Atlantic" initiative.

Current Status of Atlanticism and Europeanism

France's ability to maneuver on the Atlantic level and to improve relations with the United States is limited by, first of all, its desire to be independent of Washington, an independence it regards as the main prerequisite for stronger French influence in the world, and second, its hope of lessening the confrontation between the blocs in Europe within the framework of the all-Europe process of strengthening security and trust.

It is important to remember that the French nuclear strategy of "dissuasion" differs sharply from the American strategy. According to French estimates, the use of less than half of France's present supply of nuclear weapons in combat would immediately kill 20 million people and wound approximately the same number. In terms of the number of warheads, however, French nuclear forces are equivalent to around 2 percent of American forces. Because of the low number of France's nuclear weapons in comparison with the USSR and the

United States, French strategy is naturally devoid of "counterforce" potential and cannot be based on plans for a preemptive strike against Soviet military targets.

President Mitterand has not concealed his criticism of the American strategy of "flexible response" as a dangerous and destabilizing idea which has always had the tendency to augment first-strike counterforce potential. Besides this, Mitterand does not believe, just as de Gaulle did not believe, that the United States would be willing to sacrifice Washington for the sake of Paris even if it were to accept the strategy of "massive retaliation" (which he regards as the true strategy of deterring and preventing war). But if neither the American strategy of "flexible response" nor the acceptance of "massive retaliation" as the U.S. strategy would satisfy France as a means of guaranteeing West European security, what would? Only a West European defense. This reflects one of the contradictions in French policy, engendered by the conflicting European and Atlantic tendencies in this policy and by the incompatibility of strictly national nuclear forces with the hope of West European integration. On the one hand, France is willing to support, especially on a short- or medium-range basis, a U.S. military presence in Europe (although not on sovereign French territory!), but on the other it is taking steps and measures to reduce Western Europe's dependence on the United States and to oppose Atlanticism with stronger Europeanist affiliations.

It was France, after all, that objected to Western Europe's participation in the SDI, and did not merely object, but launched a genuine diplomatic struggle by countering the SDI with the EUREKA program of broad-scale technological integration in Western Europe in the most advanced fields with a view to the 21st century. This was demonstrated again in 1984, when the French president proposed (although unsuccessfully) the establishment of a West European military reconnaissance station in space. What was the purpose of this proposal? Once again, it was the reduction of Western Europe's military dependence on the United States.

Just before the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva in 1985, Ronald Reagan suggested a special meeting of the leaders of the seven main Western countries for the purpose of, so to speak, closing ranks. It was France, and no one else, that objected to this and split Atlantic unity, and this also attests to the continued existence of some Gaullist potential in its foreign policy.

Regardless of the problematic aspects of West European politico-military integration, a process in which the actions of Paris, London, and Bonn frequently resemble the behavior of the characters in the famous fable about the swan, the crab, and the pike, its main driving force, despite considerable difficulties, has been France. The French leadership wants to reduce Western Europe's politico-military dependence on the United States: After all, any serious attempt at integration, such as the creation of a West European army or a purely West

European military command, would unavoidably contribute to the French hope of weakening the rigid and inequitable Atlantic structures and American dominion.

It is unlikely that France is carrying out aggressive plans against the USSR in its attempts to promote integration by creating a brigade of 4,000 soldiers and officers, in conjunction with the FRG and independent of the NATO military command, as a prototype of a West European defense force. These are merely attempts to strengthen West European autonomy and map the route for the development of military integration on a defensive basis. Furthermore, as the process of detente in Europe grows stronger and develops more quickly, it is probable that France and other countries will gradually lose interest in the creation of a militarily strong West European "power center" and in an arms buildup.

The American and French approaches to detente in Europe—both by means of bilateral political dialogue with the USSR and other socialist countries and by means of the development of the all-Europe process—have their similarities and their differences. Their similarities are the result of social and politico-military factors, concern about the balance of power between East and West, the fact that both countries belong to the Atlantic system, and their fundamental conviction that the rights of citizens must be placed above the "claims or demands of the state." The differences stem from the United States' hope of retaining the leading position in the Atlantic camp and France's attempts to strengthen its own influence in Europe by lessening the confrontation between blocs, the significance of the Atlantic system, and the influence of the United States.

We must remember that France was the first Western country to embark on the road of detente and to develop political dialogue with the socialist countries in the 1960's, and it did this on its own, without any concern for Washington's reaction. This underscored its independence and was a move from the bipolar model of European security to the new system de Gaulle described as "a Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

When the FRG followed France down the road of detente in the late 1960's and early 1970's, one of the central aims of U.S. foreign policy was to take control of the situation and direct the processes related to detente into the common Atlantic channel. For this reason, we can assume that now that the tendency toward detente in Europe is growing stronger again, the United States will try to control these processes again. Conflicts are already apparent. For instance, the United States and England would prefer to modernize NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, but France is playing the middleman between them and the FRG, which would prefer a show of restraint. Another example is the major issue of the extension of credit to the USSR. The United States and England are "against" this, but the FRG and France are "for" it. These disagreements are neither instantaneous nor incidental. They occur because France has a greater interest than the United States in European detente for

the reasons mentioned above. The FRG also has its own motives: People there associate the alleviation of tension between the blocs with the hope of developing intra-German relations and enhancing the prospects—however distant they might seem—for the peaceful reunification of the two German states. England has traditionally been closer to the United States than the continental powers because of their historical ties and its strong attachment to Washington in the nuclear sphere. It is indicative that when the outlines of the grand unified market became visible on the West European horizon and when the plans were finalized for its complete establishment by 1993, it was England that began making serious stipulations, questioning, for example, the possibility of introducing a single currency and creating a central West European bank. (And what kind of unified market would it be without the cementing link of a common monetary unit?) England has less political incentive than France or the FRG to lessen the confrontation between the blocs and to increase Western Europe's autonomy in relations with the United States.

But let us return to France. Although after de Gaulle its efforts to replace the postwar European security system with a new model were gradually neutralized by Atlantic pressure from the allies and from the French public and as a result of the deterioration of East-West relations in the second half of the 1970's and the first half of the 1980's, France's interest in developing the all-Europe process instead of a "bloc dialogue" is still quite perceptible. In an IZVESTIYA interview, President Mitterand said that "the partition of Europe in the last world war put most of the European states, with the exception of the USSR, in a dependent position, and I would like them to emerge from this position."³ In 1980, when the United States essentially wanted to halt the all-Europe process because of the events in Poland and Afghanistan, France resisted. At the beginning of the 1980's it had more vehement objections to the U.S. attempts to prevent economic, scientific, and technical cooperation with the USSR. Paris wants to cut down the prohibitive lists of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control (CoCom), which are based on American export legislation.

European Security: On What Basis?

The tendencies de Gaulle once foresaw are now growing stronger in European politics. They include, above all, more active West European integration, a stronger foundation for West European autonomy, and reduced West European dependence on the United States. Furthermore, as F. Mitterand said in the previously mentioned speech in the Higher Institute of National Defense, when Western Europe has established a unified market, it will realize that "it cannot exist without the ability to secure its own defense." In view of the president's remarks about the "fatal effects" of a break between North America and Western Europe and the need to build up the European pillar of the North Atlantic alliance, however, we can assume that the present model of French relations with NATO—non-participation in the bloc's

integrated military command and the desire for a partnership based on equality and independence with the United States—is regarded by people in Paris as a promising model of relations between the United States and the integrated Western Europe. "We cannot suddenly make Europe (Western—V.M.) the master of its own fate, but if we are wise enough to proceed gradually, we will reach this goal," Mitterand said when he was interviewed by an American weekly news magazine.⁴

We must say that the number of people who support the reduction of the American military presence in Europe is rising even in the United States, and among conservatives as well as liberals. After all, American expenditures on the defense of Europe constitute a gigantic sum—around half of the entire U.S. military budget. Although at this time Washington is stubbornly defending the presence of a few dozen of its fighter planes in Western Europe even though Spain wants to get rid of them, all of this, combined with the mounting "anti-European" and "pro-Asian" feelings in the United States, suggests that de Gaulle may have been right when he predicted that the United States would "abandon Europe" in the future.

Returning to the tendencies, the second one is the democratization of domestic politics in the socialist countries and the development of political pluralism in Eastern Europe (Poland and Hungary). The gradual restoration of the historic ties between Eastern and Western Europe on this basis is an important postulate of the French idea of European security. Although France is wary of the neutralist tendencies in domestic politics in the FRG, it nevertheless regards these tendencies in the East European states as a desirable and natural process as long as the balance of power between the Soviet Union and the integrated Western Europe is maintained (at a lower level) in the future.

Third, there is the development of detente in Europe, pioneered by the USSR in the East and France in the West. Although the serious transformation of the current security system is still a distant prospect, "the postwar era in international relations," H. Kissinger remarked, "is coming to an end.... Plans for the reunification of Europe with the consent of all Europeans are conceivable for the first time since World War I."⁵

These three long-range tendencies are intermeshed and represent an equation with several unknown quantities. The main question is the following: How, on what basis, will a new European security system be established in place of the current one, especially if it has to be more stable than the traditional postwar system? The first steps in this direction are self-evident: The level of arms must be lowered, and the armed forces of the two sides must be given a non-offensive nature. France realizes that a negative attitude toward disarmament and the insistence on France's traditional independence would be counterproductive and inappropriate at a time of practical moves to establish a common European

home—"Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals." For this reason, Paris supports conventional arms reduction on the continent.

As for nuclear weapons, France is against participation in arms reduction negotiations in a situation in which its forces are equivalent to only a fraction of Soviet and American forces. After all, even if the strategic nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States were to be reduced by 50 percent, French forces, in terms of the number of warheads (at the present time), would be equivalent to just over 3 percent of these arsenals. Paris is willing to take part in negotiations if the USSR and the United States reduce their strategic nuclear weapons to dimensions comparable to the size of French forces, if the "superpowers" stop developing new types of antimissile, antisatellite, and antisubmarine systems, and if the imbalances in NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional arms are eliminated. Furthermore, Paris regards nuclear weapons not only as an instrument for the "deterrence" of the USSR, but also as the means of securing autonomous status in the Atlantic system, a certain degree of independence in relations with the United States, and political influence and leadership in Western Europe. Nuclear missiles are also viewed as an instrument for the neutralization of the FRG's superior economic strength, which is an essential attribute of a great power.

At a press conference on 18 May this year, F. Mitterand announced his intention to reduce the scales of French military construction with a view to the tendency toward detente in East-West relations. This does not mean that any major military programs will be scrapped, but it does mean that they will take longer to complete, because defense allocations will be reduced by 8 or 9 percent in 1990-1993.

At the start of the Bush administration there was every indication that the disagreements, between the United States on one side and France and England on the other, over nuclear deterrence, which R. Reagan called "immoral," defending the SDI and shocking the allies, would be surmounted. Once again, the three leading Western powers are taking a stance in favor of nuclear weapons. Although France has objected to excessive haste in the modernization of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, it is still carrying out its own national program for the development of tactical nuclear weapons with a range of 350 kilometers, comparable to the range of the American missiles that aroused the intense disagreements in NATO.

The West Europeans frequently complain that it is easier for the USSR to find a common language with the United States than with France or England in discussions of military policy because it underestimates the autonomous West European security interests. But whether we like it or not, the lessening of confrontation between the blocs and the intensification of centrifugal tendencies in the Atlantic system will cause the West Europeans, especially the French, to take a greater interest in alternative methods of safeguarding their security, both by means of arms reduction and by means of West European politico-military integration. Judging by all indications, the West is not striving to achieve military supremacy over the USSR. It is

concerned about the effects the progress in the construction of the European home might have on stability in Europe.

The West's suspicions of the Soviet idea of a non-violent, nuclear-free world are the reason for its conviction that any progress in building the all-Europe structures will necessitate substantial guarantees of stability and the maintenance of a military balance between the USSR and the West, at a lower level but necessarily a balance of power. After all, there is still no question of "universal and total disarmament."

In view of the West's adherence to nuclear deterrence, we have to answer several specific questions: What is the defensive military doctrine of the USSR on the strategic level and on the regional European level from the standpoint of the structure of nuclear forces? How many warheads will be sufficient for the reliable safeguarding of security? The common standards of frankness in the sphere of defense for the East and the West will require us to report current and projected military programs. Broader questions will also arise during the construction of the common European home: What is democracy, as a common human value? What are the other common human values? What are the political rights of the individual? How can East-West economic and technological cooperation be developed when their economic structures are so incompatible?

After decades of confrontation and brief thaws, an excessively abrupt turnabout in Soviet foreign policy would be enough in itself, as experience has shown, to arouse the suspicions of influential groups in the West, although some of the major moves of the Soviet side, such as the renunciation of ideological confrontation and the declaration of the primacy of common human interests in international relations, have noticeably improved the political climate in Europe and the rest of the world. Judging by all indications, however, the West does not intend to make any cardinal changes in its policy on European security. People in the United States, France, and other countries believe that a departure from traditional security structures will be made possible not by a belief in a non-violent, nuclear-free world, but only by the actual establishment of alternative political and military structures—a lengthy and contradictory process including such unknown quantities as, for example, the German question. This approach must be taken into account, because the common European home can only be built through joint efforts.

Footnotes

1. H. Kissinger, "Years of Upheaval," London, 1982, p 728.
2. Ibid., p 932.
3. IZVESTIYA, 2 December 1987.
4. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 7 March 1988, p 45.
5. NEWSWEEK, 19 September 1988, p 25.

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Medvedev Comments on Shorter-Range Missile Eliminations*90WC0016B Minsk SELSKAYA GAZETA in Russian
29 Oct 89 p 3*

[Article by Yu. Sutko: "A Commonplace Matter"]

[Text] On 27 October 1989 at 15 hours 17 minutes, the last SS-23 launcher in the Soviet Union was destroyed at the "Stankovo" shorter-range missile launcher elimination site. On this same day, several hours before, in the far-off steppes of Kazakhstan the last missile of this class ceased to exist.

Most of all from this trip I remember my conversation with Major V. Meshcheryakov, who participated directly in the dismantling operations. In telling about the character of the current work and his attitude toward it, he concluded most unexpectedly:

"You know, at first it was interesting to 'disarm', and then I got used to it. It was a commonplace matter."

In reality, disarmament is gradually becoming customary not only for us, but also for the entire world. Just imagine, an entire type of weapon has ceased to exist in our country. The SS-22 and SS-23 launchers, in accordance with the INF Treaty, remain only in the museums. 388 launchers and transporter vehicles passed through the hands of the soldiers in Stankovo. In turn, the last, 169th, "Pershing-1-A" was destroyed at the Texas "Longhorn" plant in July.

But let us return to Stankovo. There was reason for surprise at every turn. Journalists walked about the territory freely, and even photographed whatever they liked. American officers in blue-green jackets answered greetings in Russian. And finally the gates opened wide and let in the strictly civilian members of the Soviet Peace Fund, the Committee for Defense of Peace, and school children. The elimination of the last launcher took place before everyone's eyes.

"Today the first important step in the Soviet-American INF Treaty has been implemented!", said the chief of the National Center for Reducing the Nuclear Threat, Major-General V. Medvedev. "In a year and a half of intensive work, we have performed around 100 inspections on the territory of the United States, and the American side has performed almost 300 in the USSR. The difference in numbers is explained by the fact that,

according to the agreement, we had more facilities and more missiles of this class. In this time, both we and our transoceanic colleagues have become convinced that the form of inspections is fully efficient and allows the parties to be sure of the precision and correctness of fulfilling the responsibilities."

"The current event does not mean that the Soviet and American inspectors will be left, so to speak, without a job. For now, only the missiles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers have been eliminated. There is a parallel elimination of rockets acting in a radius of from 1,000 to 5,000 kilometers. By the present time, the sum of eliminated missiles of both classes comprised 1,440 Soviet and 385 American. In relation to the overall volume provided in the agreement, this appears as follows: Soviet Union—78 percent, United States—40 percent. We still have another year-and-a-half of joint work ahead of us. And I can say with assurance that the treaty will be fulfilled in its full volume and within the specified time."

I could not let myself walk next to American officers and not get an interview from them. The head of the senior inspection group, Thomas S. Brock, was always either busy working or with journalists. Therefore, I asked him only one question: What are your relations with the Soviet partners?

"O.K.!", he answered. "I came to you without an image of a bear with a balalaika. We have already dispelled this image. And the turnover of colleagues has been great here—after all, we work for 4 weeks. The Soviet officers are always friendly and attentive toward us. In all this time, as far as I know, not only here, but also in other places there has not been a single serious incident. We get great satisfaction from the opportunity of participating in the achievement of one historic landmark. It is doubly pleasing that it is we who have been chosen to inspect the elimination of the last Soviet launcher for shorter-range missiles. We thank our hosts for their hospitality, and greatly value the chance to move together toward peace."

The meeting ended. The transporter vehicle, now simply a powerful tractor, was parked at the nearby park. The American guests were getting ready to go home. In parting, we would like to say to them: Come again! Come not with inspections, but simply as guests, as old and reliable friends!

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner on Talks With Shevardnadze

AU1912142689 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1200 GMT 19 Dec 89

[Telephone interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by Rolf Klement in a studio at NATO Headquarters in Brussels on 19 December—recorded]

[Text] [Klement] I now welcome NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner in a Brussels studio. Hello, Mr. Woerner.

[Woerner] Hello, Mr. Klement.

[Klement] As we have just heard a report on Romania, may I ask you whether the situation in Romania played a role during your meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze today?

[Woerner] Not during our talk. He made a statement to the press after our talk.

[Klement] He did not give you any details?

[Woerner] No, he did not.

[Klement] According to a wire dispatch today, you assessed your talk with Shevardnadze as friendly. Is this assessment correct?

[Woerner] We said that it was a friendly and important talk; we both said so, and I stick to it.

[Klement] Will this meeting give an impetus to the Vienna conventional disarmament negotiations or to the START negotiations where nuclear weapons are discussed?

[Woerner] Disarmament has indeed played a major role in our talk. I expounded our ideas, and he mentioned his ideas. I think that we agree that both the Soviet Union and NATO expect two agreements to be concluded next year, and both sides work for this goal—first an agreement on conventional disarmament, and second an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in intercontinental strategic weapons. If this were to be possible—and we both consider this possibility—I can only say that we have really taken a good step forward.

[Klement] Did you also discuss chemical weapons?

[Woerner] Of course, we also discussed chemical weapons. Here, too, we agreed that we must try, as soon as possible, to reach agreement on a total ban on chemical weapons. I think that we should consider a period of about 2 years, and that would also be a huge step forward.

[Klement] Mr. Woerner, what do you feel when you sit with a Soviet foreign minister, considering the fact that several months ago NATO was dealt with and treated like the great aggressor by the Warsaw Pact?

[Woerner, laughing] Yes, Mr. Klement, it is really a good feeling. At a time of such incredibly rapid change, almost everything seems possible. This is certainly an event about which we can be happy, because it shows that the Soviet Union recognizes NATO and its significance, and realizes that this alliance does not hinder change but promotes it, and provides the necessary stability in this respect.

[Klement] Would you suggest that Western politicians from the NATO states pay an official visit to the Warsaw Pact?

[Woerner] We have not reached this stage. Of course, we have quite a number of bilateral contacts. We, the Warsaw Pact members and the NATO states, negotiate in Vienna, as you know. However, before official contacts between the two alliance systems are established, the Warsaw Pact must change. It should be remembered that we are an alliance of freely elected, democratic, sovereign states. The Warsaw Pact is developing in that direction but still has a long way to go. However, Shevardnadze told me that they have an interest in seeing the Warsaw Pact develop in the direction of a political alliance of sovereign states on the basis of self-determination.

[Klement] Did he extend an invitation to visit Moscow?

[Woerner] He did not extend a formal invitation. He said when he got into his car that it would be nice if I could come to Moscow in the foreseeable future.

[Klement] Mr. Woerner, thank you very much for this interview.

CANADA

Soviet Nuclear Submarine Pledge Pleases Canadian Officials

52200008A Ottawa THE OTTAWA CITIZEN
in English 25 Nov 89 p A16

[Untitled article by Julian Beltrame]

[Text] Leningrad—Canadian officials said Friday they are encouraged by a Soviet promise not to operate nuclear attack submarines in the Canadian Arctic.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was quoted in the government newspaper IZVESTIA as saying: "First, we are prepared to state here and now that Soviet submarines will not enter the waters of the Canadian archipelago."

However, interpretation varied on whether Shevardnadze meant the Soviets have never operated in Canadian waters in the Arctic.

And while welcoming the statement as peg for future talks, External Affairs Minister Joe Clark said he believes the Soviets have been active in the area in the past.

Clark said his Soviet counterpart assured him Soviet naval forces would not operate in northern Canadian waters.

The Canadian minister added that he believes the Soviets have been active in the Canadian Arctic, but ducked a question whether he thought the practise was continuing.

And he said the Shevardnadze statement holds the promise that the Soviets will agree to participate in a "regime" with at least Canada and United States for prior notification of nuclear submarines and aircraft operations in the Arctic.

"There's definitely been an evolution... a rapprochement on both sides," said Clark's spokesman, Abbe Damn.

Clark said he will meet Shevardnadze in Ottawa in February to continue talks on President Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 proposal of a "zone of peace" in the Arctic. Gorbachev urged Canada to enter into bilateral talks on demilitarizing the northern region.

But Clark said he insisted Canada has not wavered from the long-standing position that issues involving the nuclear balance must remain the subject of NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations. "And they now understand that."

On the last stop on his Soviet visit, Mulroney spoke to 300 scientists at the Arctic and Antarctic Institute. He proposed that the eight circumpolar nations established a council to co-operate on every facet of Arctic life, except military issues.

And he announced establishment of a Canadian Polar Commission to study the region.

CYPRUS

Spokesman on Mersin Issue, Military Maneuvers

NC1912170689 Nicosia Domestic Service in Greek
1600 GMT 19 Dec 89

[Text] The Cyprus government insists that the Port of Mersin, where the Turkish invasion of Cyprus was launched in 1974, must not be excluded from the region to which the agreement for the reduction of conventional weapons and armaments in Europe refers.

In a statement today, government spokesman Akis Fandis stressed that the Mersin region is of vital importance to Cyprus and a region of shame for Turkey. The Turkish invasion began there and the occupation is replenished from there. The enormous concentration of firepower there is a grave danger to Cyprus' survival as an independent and free state.

The spokesman added that the huge air and sea maneuvers near Cyprus that Turkey is conducting now strengthen the correctness of this position.

Turkey is again attempting a show of strength while simultaneously violating international air-traffic regulations. This follows immediately after Greek reservations were accepted in Brussels.

Finally, the spokesman expressed the hope that Turkey's allies will point out that this is not acceptable international behavior.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Nuclear Equipment Sold to Iraq by FRG Company

AU1812134589 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
18 Dec 89 pp 93-94

[Text] In the computer of the Federal Office for Criminal Investigations [BKA] the case is listed under Number BS+01/01 (99): "Accused: Hinze, Dietrich, born 25 March 1938, Balz/Brandenburg."

The BKA and the Federal Investigation Service (BND) have turned the case into a top-secret matter. The customs investigators, who were called by authorities and investigated the Hinze case, were not given the background information. Only one sentence in the computer indicates the facts: "The accused is allegedly producing parts of facilities for gas ultracentrifuges for follow-up construction in Iraq."

Dietrich Hinze and his associate Peter Huetten own the machine factory H and H Metalform Ltd. in Drensteinfurt near Muenster. Over the past 2 years the company allegedly delivered machinery to Iraq which can be used for the production of gas ultracentrifuges. With such facilities it is possible to enrich uranium 235 by 90 percent. The result of the production is the material used for a nuclear bomb.

A new scandal is in the offing, perhaps one as serious as the delivery of the poison gas plant to Libya. According to the investigations so far, the Iraq deal is probably bigger than all illegal nuclear exports from Germany to date—even the illegal delivery of parts for Pakistan's nuclear armament.

Once again, the FRG government must expect serious accusations by the Allies, in particular, by the United States. The U.S. State Department has long suspected that highly dangerous German material for weapons has been delivered to Iraq, the worst enemy of the State of Israel.

In the meantime, the Bonn government has learned some things about the case, and these things are alarming. In addition to the H and H delivery, German nuclear experts, who have had access to top-secret documents, have allegedly sold their knowledge to Iraq.

The BKA and the BND have found Walter Busse, 77, as one of the wire-pullers. In the past, Busse was department head of MAN Technology Ltd. in Munich. Over a period of many years and without the knowledge of his then-employer, he allegedly established a dense network of relations between nuclear-bomb builders in Iraq and Brazil on the one hand, and German contractors on the other.

During the investigations, the investigator noted that retiree Busse was in Iraq at least twice last year and this year. Busse is considered the man who established relations for H and H with the two Iraqi arms specialists Anees Wadi and Dr Safa al-Habbuby, who have been given special powers by the state.

Sometimes Busse was accompanied on his visits to the Tigris River by a good friend, Bruno Stemmler, 56, exporter for rotor technology at MAN Technology Ltd. Stemmler's escapades in Iraq were also unknown to his superiors.

According to the findings of the investigators, Busse urgently needed the MAN expert for special work at the Iraqi construction site of Tuwaytha [spelling as published]. This is the center of Iraqi nuclear research; Western know-how is in high demand. Busse and Stemmler have quite a few things to offer.

MAN Technology Ltd is a specialist there for centrifuge technology. In 1979 the Munich company built an assembly plant for centrifuges in the area of the uranium enrichment plant in Gronau, Westphalia.

Busse and Stemmler allegedly supervised the production of the H and H facilities in Tuwaytha. Centrifuges were produced there with H and H flow-turn machinery (construction serial DV 450-40-2100).

Even though the delivery of this nuclear technology is spectacular, illegal arms exports to Iraq are far from unusual. Dozens of FRG companies have already delivered technology and know-how for the Saad 16 armament project near Mosul in the north of the country.

There, Iraq's President Saddam Husayn promotes the development of new arms technologies; there, he has chemical combat agents produced and missiles of various ranges built. However, the special ambition of the militant statesman has for many years been directed toward nuclear bomb development.

Since 1981 at the latest, Husayn has been considered the man building nuclear bombs. At that time the Israeli Air Force destroyed the Iraqi reactor complex of Osirak near Baghdad.

At that time, the Israelis considered the first air attack directed at a reactor necessary to prevent the obviously imminent production of nuclear bombs. In Tel Aviv there was, and still is, concern that the Iraqis might equip Palestinian terrorist leaders with the bomb.

According to information gained by Western intelligence services, Husayn seems to be very close to the bomb. The Iraqis have aimed for this goal with much perseverance and skill. And they did not shy away from any expenditures.

Nuclear purchasers from Baghdad established contacts everywhere nuclear technology or know-how could be bought legally or illegally. Among other things, their route took them to Brazil, to the Avibras armament company there. There they got to know a German expert—Busse.

The former MAN manager was able to contribute good relations with German companies, in particular with H and H in Drensteinfurt. The two owners, Hinze and Huettner, for their part had good business with Avibras.

H and H has delivered quite a few instruments for precision arms technology to Brazil—preforms for the cases of missile engines and engine parts.

The orders from Baghdad put snap into the company. During the last years of the war against Iran, Iraq bought missile casings mainly from H and H. The demand was high; in only one night at the end of 1987 the Iraqi army fired 6,000 missiles at the enemy.

This barrage amounted to 3 months' production at H and H. At DM4,000 per unit it is not astonishing that the turnover skyrocketed. Within only 5 years Metalform increased its turnover by more than 10 times, to about DM42 million.

The Iranians, too, would have liked to buy cartridges (cases for missiles) in the Muensterland region. But H and H did not show any interest in doing business with Iraq's enemy.

Perhaps the renunciation was not quite voluntary. Perhaps the "worldwide experts for space travel or cooking pots" (their own advertisement) are no longer masters in their own house. Investigators of BKA and BND suspect that the Iraqis are secretly participating in the company.

The entrepreneurs from the Muensterland region deny this. However, the investigators have an H and H telefax to Iraqi negotiators in London. This telefax bears the phrase in Arabic handwriting: "A company which can be bought."

Perhaps events in the western Muensterland region might have been stopped 3 years ago—without any major damage. At that time, the customs investigation authority for the Muenster financial district found the first indications of improper business operations.

In 66 deliveries, H and H had exported 16,200 parts for missile engines to the Netherlands (value DM5.02 million) and an instrument for the production of missile engine cases (DM36,840) to Brazil. Neither export was approved.

The official reaction corresponded to the laxness concerning illegal exports, which also became evident in the case of Imhausen/al-Rabitah. "Because of the revealed violations of laws" the Muenster Higher Financial Directorate imposed a fine of DM2,000.

The delivery to Sao Paulo of a flow-turn machine (price DM1.982 million), which is suitable for the production of centrifuges, was not challenged at all. The purchaser was the Navy Committee, responsible for Brazilian uranium enrichment.

DER SPIEGEL Cited on U.S. Chemical Arms Move

AU2212105289 Paris AFP in English 1603 GMT
21 Dec 89

[Text] Bonn, Dec 21 (AFP)— The United States will pull out some 7,000 tonnes of deadly chemical weapons from West Germany in 1990, according to a report to appear in the West German weekly DER SPIEGEL next week.

VX combat gas and mustard gas are to be flown from West Germany to the Johnston Atoll, 1,120 kilometers (700 miles) southwest of Hawaii, in the South Pacific, where they will then be burned, according to the report.

An arms-removal accord was signed in 1986 by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and former U.S. President Ronald Reagan.

West German authorities have been silent about the operation until now, fearing terrorist attacks on the convoys, according to DER SPIEGEL, which referred to "secret plans" agreed by Washington and Bonn to remove the deadly chemicals.

At least 25 road convoys of 80 trucks each will be needed to transport the chemicals to the northern town of Nordenham, from where they will be flown to the South Pacific. Twenty trucks in each group will transport the chemicals, while the other trucks will carry security forces.

DER SPIEGEL said each convoy would have an escort of 1,000 policemen.

Genscher on Disarmament, Borders, GDR Relations

AU2912110389 Hamburg BILD in German
29 Dec 89 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher by Karl-Ludwig Guensche and Wolfgang Kenntemich; place and date not given]

[Text] [BILD] Have you fully recovered from your heart attack of this summer?

[Genscher] Yes, I have completely recovered, even though I had to ignore a lot of advice from doctors. The dramatic events in the GDR and in Eastern Europe have been a good cure for me and have stimulated me.

[BILD] Will you still be foreign minister after the Bundestag elections?

[Genscher] It depends on the voters; I will gladly stay in office.

[BILD] Many of your goals (democracy in Eastern Europe, perforation of the Berlin Wall) were achieved in 1989; do you consider yourself the man of the year?

[Genscher] I think that the people in the GDR and in all of central and Eastern Europe are the people of the year 1989. They have helped freedom and reason to triumph. This is why they deserve this distinction.

[BILD] What will come next?

[Genscher] We must turn 1990 into the year of disarmament. Immediately after the agreement on conventional disarmament, which is planned for the mid-nineties, we must begin further comprehensive disarmament talks.

[BILD] Will all nuclear weapons be removed?

[Genscher] One will continue to have nuclear weapons as a deterrent. However, I cannot imagine that anyone could still propose to acquire new short-range missiles, which are only aimed at the democratized GDR, CSSR, or at Poland.

[BILD] East and West have criticized the chancellor because he does not clearly recognize Poland's western border.

[Genscher] Chancellor Kohl supported the Bundestag resolution that upheld my declaration to the United Nations, namely that neither now nor in the future will we Germans challenge Poland's western border and make territorial claims. As far as these facts are concerned there is no disagreement between the chancellor and myself. Moreover, the federal president has supported our attitude. The criticism of President Weizsaecker is out of place and unjustified. I reject it. This criticism damages our national interests, it threatens the establishment of closer ties between West and East in Europe, and thus even the coming closer together of the two Germanies.

IRELAND

Inspection of Suspected Chemical Weapons Plants Urged

52500014A Dublin IRISH INDEPENDENT in English
27 Sep 89 p 10

[Text] The Soviet Union has gone one step further in the matter of chemical weapons. Through its Foreign Minister, Mr Shevardnadze, Moscow told the United Nations yesterday that it was prepared to destroy all its chemical weapons. This against President Bush's offer to cut back chemical weapons by 80 per cent. The one-upmanship displayed yesterday can be ignored: What

matters most is that the two most powerful countries in the world are prepared to abolish and ban forever the use of chemical weapons.

Just what those weapons can do has been hinted at now and then. But the proof of the lethal effects of a chemical warfare attack came through television film which showed the population of a Kurdish town wiped out by Iraqi gas bombs. Men, women and children lay strewn around streets and rooms looking as if they had merely gone asleep. This was the kind of horror which could have happened if the Soviet Union and the United States had gone to war.

But while we should be grateful to the superpowers for their decision, we have to remember that there are other countries in the world which have chemical weapons and the capacity to make them. Libya is suspected of having such a facility, and no doubt other Middle Eastern States are not far behind. Experts claim that many commercial chemical industries can be used to make chemical weapons. If this is so, then those same experts will have to find a way of inspecting suspect plants.

UNITED KINGDOM

NATO Officials Pessimistic on Troop Cuts Talks

52500012 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH
in English 5 Nov 89 p 5

[Article by John Keegan, defence editor: "NATO Chiefs Fear Deal on Troop Cuts Will Fail"]

[Text] Senior NATO commanders are becoming increasingly pessimistic about an agreement to reduce conventional forces in Europe being signed as planned by next autumn.

"The pace of talks is slowing down," a senior NATO official said. "The danger is that they will get bogged down in detail as MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions] did in the 1970s."

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) talks, which began in Vienna in March, are designed to institute "asymmetrical" cuts in the orders of battle of the Western and Soviet alliances.

Because the Warsaw Pact deploys superior numbers of tanks, artillery and armoured carriers, it is necessary for the Soviet bloc to give up more than Nato if an agreement is to be reached.

The principle of "asymmetry" has already been conceded by Mr Gorbachev, who in December 1988 announced immediate unilateral cuts in the Soviet armed forces of 5,000 tanks and 500,000 men.

To achieve a stable balance, however, much larger reductions are required. Figures of 275,000 troops and 22,000

tanks, to be met both by the Soviet Union and the United States in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region, is now the target.

If the talks were limited to ground weapons they might still be proceeding on schedule.

Two new categories have, however, obtruded since March—aircraft and personnel. Both present severe negotiating difficulties, technically known as those of "counting" and "reintroduction".

"Counting" is more complex than simple arithmetic. It entails making definitions about what is to be counted. This poses problems, when one side regards a particular type of aircraft as a combat element and the other does not.

"Reintroduction" particularly concerns aircraft, which can be swiftly deployed over long distances from areas where their presence might be permissible to areas from which they had been banned.

NATO inferiority in aircraft is not as marked as in ground weapons, and the Soviet Union has been anxious to achieve reductions of a category of weapons with which Nato is capable of penetrating deep into the Soviet bloc.

The agreement to discuss aircraft has, however, threatened to compromise the whole negotiations, since safeguards on "reintroduction" are difficult to verify, even at the cost of diplomatic concessions.

Mr Hans Binnendijke, director of studies at the London International Institute of Strategic Studies, said he believed aircraft would "have to be taken off the table" if next autumn's target was to be met.

Observers of the Soviet military scene also believe that the discussion of personnel figures is generating opposition to manpower concessions within the Soviet armed forces.

Soviet servicemen, already alarmed for their future by Gorbachev's unilateral cuts, now fear that they face unemployment in tens of thousands.

- Army commanders in West Germany fear there will be savage reductions in training exercises in the face of pressure on public spending and opposition from the German population, writes Simon O'Dwyer-Russell.

Commanders believe ministers will be obliged to protect politically-sensitive equipment programmes and opt to bite hard into training budgets.

One senior Army source said such cuts would be "near-invisible, meaning ministers can stand up in the Commons and claim that nothing is amiss".

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